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Toward an International Fourth
Amendment: Rethinking Searches
and Seizures Abroad After VerdugoUrquidez
Eric Bentley, Jr.*
ABSTRACT
Should the Fourth Amendment reach abroad to protect
noncitizens when United States law enforcement agents
conduct searches and seizures in aforelgn state? The courts
have assumed this to be a closed question since 1990, when

the Supreme Court, in a broadly worded plurality opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, asserted that the Amendment
protects only citizens and other members of the "national
community." However, as this Article points out, the Chief
Justice's plurality opinion in United States v. VerdugoUrquidez did not represent the judgment of a majority of the
Court and therefore does not foreclose continued
considerationof the scope of the FourthAmendment abroad.
This Article addresses the principal questions that the
Verdugo decision and subsequent scholarship have left
unresolved: Does the Fourth Amendment's command that
searches and seizures be "reasonable"apply to searches of
noncitizens abroad? And if so, what does It mean for a
search to be "reasonable"in a foreign state? The author
argues that the alternativesproposed by the Supreme Court
In Verdugo-elther confining the Amendment to the water's
edge or applying it in full force whenever the United States
acts abroad-donot take proper account of the transnational
nature of extraterritorial searches. The author proposes

* Law clerk, Hon. Leonard B. Sand, United States District Court, Southern
District of New York; B.A., 1987, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1993,

Yale Law School. This Article originated as a student paper at Yale Law School,
and in an earlier version was awarded the school's Ambrose Gherini Prize. I owe
a deep debt to Professor Michael Reisman, who suggested the project and then
provided invaluable advice and support. Thanks are due as well to Philip
Bentley, who brought clarity to successive drafts, and to Arthur Eisenberg, Evan

van Hook, and Ruth Wedgwood for their valuable comments and suggestions.
329

330

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:329

instead that any determination of the "reasonableness"of
foreign searches take into account their transnationalnature
by reconciling United States search-and-selzure standards
with either International law or the laws of the states with
which the United States actsjointly abroad.
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I. INTRODUCTION

United States law enforcement takes place increasingly
outside national borders, extending to United States citizens and
noncitizens alike. What was patently obvious to the Supreme
Court a half century ago-that "[nleither the Constitution nor the
laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory
unless in respect of our own citizens"L-is today just as patently
untrue. Today, United States citizens and foreign nationals both
must take care, no matter where on the globe they live or work,
not to violate a host of United States laws, ranging from antitrust
and securities laws to environmental laws, narcotics laws, and
laws pertaining to fraud and violent crimes. 2 Enforcing such laws
against acts committed on foreign soil requires an ever greater
share of the resources of United States law enforcement agencies
and takes place within an increasingly comprehensive web of
international agreements. 3 These efforts have made it more and
1. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936);
accord United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937); American Banana Co.

v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 494 U.S. 259, 279-81 &
nn.1-4 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing United States criminal laws
applicable to foreign nationals abroad); V. Rock Grundman. The New Imperialism:
The ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law, 14 INT'L LAw. 257 (1980);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
InternationalLaw, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 880, 884-92 (1989); Russell J. Weintraub, The

ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry Into the
Utility of a "Cholce-of-Law"Approach, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1799 (1992).

3.

See generally ETHAN A. NADELMANN, CoPs ACROSS BORDERS:

THE

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (1993) [hereinafter Cops
ACROSS BORDERS]; Richard A. Martin, Problems in InternationalLaw Enforcement,
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more possible for the United States to reach across borders to nab
suspects. With this increasing power, however, comes the threat
of abuse, for it Is not clear that the rights of suspects in such
operations have kept pace with the ability of the United States to

apprehend them. As the United States law enforcement sword
reaches farther abroad than ever before, it is unclear what kind of
shield accompanies it.
The Supreme Court,

along

with

most

commentators,

generally has divided into two camps on the issue of the degree of
constitutional protection to be afforded to suspects apprehended

outside United States borders. One side in the debate perceives
United States constitutional standards to reach abroad in full
force whenever the United States acts abroad; that Is, state
actions and constitutional protections from these actions are

coextensive.

The other side sees the Constitution as largely

stopping at the water's edge. 4

This "water's edge" approach

appears to be in ascendance, as evidenced by the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in both the criminal and civil context,

which express the view that the United States can generally
operate
abroad free from
constitutional,
statutory, or
international law restrictions.5 This Article will focus on one of
these recent decisions, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,6 which
provides the Court's most comprehensive examination of the

reach of the Constitution in the law enforcement context.
In Verdugo, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
Fourth

Amendment

protects

a

Mexican

suspect

from

a

14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 519 (1990-91); Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United
States In the InternationalEnforcement of Criminal Law, 31 HAnv. INT'L L.J. 37
(1990) [hereinafter Int'l Enforcement]. In 1988 alone, for example, DEA agents
participated in overseas investigations that culminated in more than 1200 arrests

of narcotics traffickers abroad.

Brief for the United States, United States v.

Verdugo-Urquidez (No. 88-1353) at *28, availablein LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs
File (reproduced without original page numbers; * pagination references
correspond to LExIS's pagination of the Verdugo briefs) [hereinafter Brief for the
United States, Brief for Respondent Verdugo, Reply Brief for the United States]
(citing DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 1990 AUTHORIZATION AND BuDGET
REgUEST TO THE U.S. CONGRESS 28 (1989)).
4.
See infra part II.B.
5.
See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993)
(holding that statute and human rights covenant prohibiting "return" of refugees
did not apply to United States action outside United States territorial waters);
United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (holding that
constitutional requirement of due process does not bar United States from
kidnapping and prosecuting foreign suspect in violation of extradition treaty);
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (domestic statutes
presumed not to apply abroad absent "clear statement" of extraterritorial intent);
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Fourth Amendment does
not apply to search of nonresident alien's home in foreign state) (plurality
opinion).
6.
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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warrantless search of his home in Mexico by United States and

Mexican police. The Court split five ways on the matter, with a
four-Justice plurality, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, concluding that the Fourth Amendment does not
reach abroad to protect a foreign suspect who lacks a "substantial
connection" with the United States. Two Justices, Stevens and
Kennedy, concurred more narrowly, and three Justices dissented,
with Justice Brennan arguing in the most substantial dissent
that the Fourth Amendment should apply in its totality wherever
United States power is exercised.
Verdugo has generated reams of commentary. 7 Virtually all

of that commentary, however, has remained essentially within the
framework set forth in the opinions of Justices Rehnquist and

Brennan; the former confining the Fourth Amendment essentially
to the water's edge, the latter applying the Fourth Amendment in

its totality abroad. 8 This Article questions that framework and
suggests an alternative approach to the articulation of Fourth
Amendment standards beyond United States borders. It argues
that the Supreme Court's method fails because its basic premises,

which are part of the Fourth Amendment framework the Court
has inherited, are inadequate to the international context. The
Court's domestic perspective cramps its analysis and leaves it
with a limited and inflexible set of alternatives.
A more
satisfactory alternative, this Article suggests, is the adoption of an
international, or transnational approach, which seeks to
harmonize the Fourth Amendment with either international law
or the laws of the states with which the United States acts jointly
abroad.9

7.
See sources cited Infra notes 67, 68.
8.
See Id. The lower federal courts also have failed to grapple adequately
with the issues raised by the Verdugo opinion. See Infra note 137.
9.
The scope of this Article is limited to nonmilitary searches and seizures
of evidence in foreign states. Seizures of persons abroad raise a host of other
issues, which have been extensively examined in the literature on the Supreme
Court's 1992 decision of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992). See, e.g., Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? ForeignAbduction
After Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REv. 939 (1993).
Searches by the military likewise raise issues not addressed in this Article.
See, e.g., John P. Coffey, Note, The Navy's Role In Interdicting Narcotics Traffic:
War on Drugs or Ambush on the Constitution?, 75 Gao. L.J. 1947 (1987);
Christopher A. Donesa, Note, Protecting National Interests: The Legal Status of
ExtraterritorialLaw Enforcement by the Military, 41 DUKE L.J. 867 (1992). Also not
addressed, except in passing, are searches or surveillance conducted pursuant to
the President's national security power. See United States v. United States Dist.
Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972); David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An
Assessment of the Validity of Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 611.
Finally, searches on the high seas raise issues distinguishable from searches
in foreign states, and will not be addressed in this Article. See, e.g., James S.
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This Article proceeds in four main parts. Part II (which
follows the Introduction) describes the Verdugo case and argues
that none of the five opinions that comprise the Court's decision
approach the issue of the Fourth Amendment's extraterritorial
reach from a sufficiently broad or flexible perspective.
This
portion of the Article examines the approaches of Justices
Brennan and Rehnquist and explores the problems inherent in
their sweeping positions and, more broadly, in approaches that
view extraterritorial searches solely from the perspective of United
States law enforcement agents and United States law. Part II
concludes that an approach is needed that is both more flexible
and more sensitive to the cooperative and transnational nature of
law enforcement beyond United States borders.
Part III sets out the building blocks for an "International"
Fourth Amendment.
An extraterritorial Fourth Amendment,
applicable to United States citizens and noncitizens alike, remains
possible after Verdugo because a majority of the Supreme Court
failed to support the purported holding of Chief Justice

Rehnqust-that the Fourth Amendment stops at the water's edge
for all except United States citizens and residents. This sweeping
position, which lower federal courts have subsequently assumed
to be the Court's holding,lo in fact represents the judgment of
only four Justices in Verdugo-the Chief Justice plus the three
Justices who joined him in the plurality opinion. Neither of the
two Justices who concurred (creating a six-Justice majority)
joined in the full sweep of the Chief Justice's conclusion; both
instead confined themselves to the narrower conclusion that the
Amendment's warrant requirement is inapplicable abroad."
Thus, only four Justices have endorsed the Chief Justice's
"water's edge" rule for the Amendment's other, and more central,
requirement-that searches and seizures not be "unreasonable."
This inconclusive result provides the foundation for the remainder
of the Article, which urges the extraterritorial application of the
"reasonableness" requirement and attempts a preliminary
exploration of what it might mean for searches and seizures to be
"reasonable" in a foreign state.
Part V proposes two alternative transnational approaches for
determining the "reasonableness" of extraterritorial searches. The
first alternative, drawing on choice-of-law principles, would be to
look to the search-and-seizure standards of the jurisdiction in
which the search takes place, as well as to those of the United
Carmichael, Comment, At Sea with the FourthAmendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV.51
(1977); Greg Shelton, Note, The United States Coast Guard's Law Enforcement
Authority Under 14 U.S.C. § 89: Smugglers' Blues or Boaters' Nightmare?, 34 WM.
& MARY L. REV.933 (1993).
10. See tnfra note 137.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.

1994]

AN INTERNATIONAL FOURTHAMENDMENT

States, and to declare transnational searches unlawful only when
they violate both local and United States standards. The second
alternative would be to adopt an international benchmark
approach-that is, to construct a Fourth Amendment floor of
minimally acceptable conduct out of international human rights
norms and the search-and-seizure practices of the world's major
legal systems..
Part V completes the analysis by addressing three issues that

must be confronted under either of these two proposed
approaches.
First, the Article discusses the "joint venture"
doctrine, which requires that United States police play a leading
role in any foreign search before the Fourth Amendment will be
deemed applicable; a loosening of this requirement is urged.
Second, in order to protect United States law enforcement agents
from being penalized for unlawful acts by their foreign
counterparts to which they did not contribute, a limited "good
faith" exception is proposed under which unlawfully seized
evidence would be admitted if United States agents could show
that they neither sanctioned nor encouraged the violation.
Finally, the Article briefly reviews the debate over whether, and
under what circumstances, separation-of-powers principles
should allow the executive branch to ignore constitutional
dictates when acting abroad.

II

VERDUGO AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS

The Constitution neither specifies the extent of its
geographical reach nor identifies the "people" or "persons" it
protects. Both these issues have been the source of disagreement
and contention virtually from the moment of the constitutional
founding.
As the United States expanded and established
territories beyond the original colonial states, questions of the'
Constitution's geographical scope became increasingly relevant.
As evidenced by the fierce debates over the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798, the youthful United States also faced questions
about whether the Constitution protected noncitizens within its
borders. 1 2
These questions, which had cropped up only

sporadically for most of United States

history, became

increasingly urgent after the Second World War, as the United

12. For a comprehensive discussion of the debate over the scope of the
Constitution from the founding to the present, putting the Verdugo-Urquidez
decision within this context, see Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100
YALE L.J. 909 (1991).
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States rapidly increased its efforts to apply United States laws
around the world. 13
One much-noted development in the 1980s gave these
questions of geographical and personal scope a particularly sharp
edge-the exponential increase in the prosecution of international
narcotics traffickers, both on the high seas and in foreign
states. 14 Large-scale transnational law enforcement efforts raised
questions, not previously fully resolved, about the extraterritorial

scope of the Fourth Amendment.15

While courts for the last

century have extended constitutional rights to aliens, including
illegal aliens, inside the United States1 6 and additionally have
17
extended constitutional rights to United States citizens abroad,
they have been slower to resolve the question of aliens'
The question of the Fourth
constitutional rights abroad.1 8
13.

See Grundman, supra note 2.

14.

See generally STEVEN WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON

DRUGS (1986); Ethan A. Nadelmann, U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export, 70 FOREIGN
POL'y, Spring 1988, at 83.
15. See, e.g., 1986 ATTY GEN. ANN. REP. (describing international scope of
United States law enforcement efforts); Mark Gibney, Policing the World. The Long
Reach of U.S. Law and the Short Arm of the Constitution, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 103
(1990); Elizabeth A. Corrandino, Note, The Fourth Amendment Overseas: Is
ExtraterritorialProtectionof ForeignNationals Going Too Far?, 57 FORDHAM L. REV.
617 (1989); Note, The ExtraterrltorlalApplicability of the FourthAmendment, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1672 (1989) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. See also articles cited Infra
note 77.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828. 837-39 (1987)
(illegal aliens entitled to due process before conviction for unlawful reentry into
.United States); Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (illegal alien children entitled by
Fourteenth Amendment to admission to public schools); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (illegal aliens protected by Fifth Amendment from Invidious
discrimination by federal government); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,

238 (1896) (all persons within United States territory entitled to protection of Fifth
and Sixth amendment trial rights); Ylck Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)
(all persons within United States territory entitled to Fourteenth Amendment
protection); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw (1987) [hereinafter
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT] § 422 cmt. c(iv) (trial rights), § 722 cmt. a &

reporters' notes 3, 4. 7, 14 (general rights of aliens in United States). A potential
weakening of this commitment is signaled in dicta in Chief Justice Rehnquist's

Opinion of the Court in Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 270-72. See lnfra notes 75-76 and
accompanying text.
17. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v.
Covert. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (extending habeas corpus protection to United States

citizens convicted by United States military tribunal abroad).
18.

See United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Mikva,

J., concurring specially) ("the Supreme Court has never determined whether
aliens are entitled to the protections of our Bill of Rights outside the United
States"); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988)

("Strangely enough, this question [of aliens' Fourth Amendment rights outside
United States territory] has not yet been answered by the Supreme Court or
definitively resolved by any circuit court of appeals. Indeed, until this case, we
have been content simply to assume that the fourth amendment constrains the
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Amendment's applicability to aliens abroad reached the Supreme
Court for the first time in Verdugo.
A. The Verdugo Decision
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was an alleged leader of a
large and violent Mexican drug-smuggling ring and a participant
in the notorious torture-murder of United States Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent Enrique
Camarena-Salazar. In 1986, pursuant to a United States warrant
for his arrest, Mexican police, allegedly secretly hired by United
States law enforcement officials, seized Verdugo and transported
him to the United States border in Calexico, California, where he
was turned over to United States marshals.19
After taking custody of Verdugo and moving him to a San
Diego jail, DEA agents, seeking evidence related to Verdugo's
narcotics trafficking and his involvement in the Camarena
murder, contacted Mexican federal police in Mexico City to obtain
authorization to search two residences, in Mexicali and San
manner in which the federal government may pursue its extraterritorial law
enforcement objectives."), rev'd, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). The Supreme Court,
however, has determined that nonresident enemy aliens in time of war are not
entitled to constitutional protections. Johnson v. Elsentrager, 339 U.S. 763

(1950). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law says only that the Issue
of aliens' rights outside the United States "has not been authoritatively
adjudicated." FOREIGN RELATIONS REsTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 722 cmt. m. It
adds, "at least some actions by the United States In respect of foreign nationals
outside the country are... subject to constitutional limitations." Id.
19. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1991),
vacated, 112 S.Ct. 2986 (1992). The circumstances of Verdugo's arrest and
informal "extradition" provide a point of connection to another, even more
publicized case-that of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, the Mexican doctor, also
implicated in the Camarena murder, who was abducted In Mexico and turned
over to the DEA by Mexicans whom the DEA had hired for the job. Both Verdugo
and Alvarez appealed on the identical ground that they had been illegally
abducted in violation of the extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico. Alvarez' case reached the Supreme Court in 1992, producing a highly
controversial opinion in which a divided Court held that the circumstances of a
defendant's arrest and transportation into the trial court's jurisdiction have no
effect on the court's jurisdiction over him. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112
S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
Verdugo's appeal followed his 1990 Supreme Court defeat on the Fourth
Amendment issue and his subsequent conviction at trial on all charges. His
kidnapping allegation was supported by Mexican prosecutors In Baja, who fied
kidnapping charges against the six officers who had abducted him, who
meanwhile had fled to the United States. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
allegations, if true, would require reversal of Verdugo's conviction and dismissal
of the indictment. 939 F.2d at 1362. The Supreme Court, however, held
Verdugo's petition in suspense pending its disposition of the Alvarez-Machain
case, and then summarily vacated and remanded in light of that decision. United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992).
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Felipe, believed to belong to Verdugo. 2O The United States agents
did not attempt to obtain a warrant for the search, either in the
United States or Mexico, but instead sought to obtain less formal
authorization over the telephone. 2 1
A top Mexican Federal
Judicial Police (MFJP) official approved the search by telephone
the next day, and authorized the assignment of several MFJP
22
officers.
A joint force of four DEA agents and ten to fifteen Mexican
officers arrived after dark and proceeded to search the Mexicali
and San Felipe houses, in addition to a house in nearby Playa del
Sol not mentioned in the original request.2 3 Mexican officers took
charge of the residential entries; they broke into two of the
houses, which were empty, and were admitted into the third by
Its occupants. According to the findings of the district court, DEA
and MFJP officers jointly conducted the searches inside the
houses, following oral instructions from the DEA agent in charge.
DEA agents took all documentary evidence seized from the
houses.
Mexican officers seized a 1984 Grand Marquis
automobile, some three-wheeled vehicles, and weapons. Although
required to do so under United States law, the DEA agents failed
to leave a receipt indicating what items had been seized or to

promptly inventory the items.
Before trial, Verdugo moved to suppress all evidence seized in
the Mexlcali and Playa del Sol searches, which included a tally
sheet apparently recording drug transactions. The district court
granted his motion.2 4 The court held, first, that the Fourth
Amendment protects aliens from United States action abroad and,
second, that the Amendment applied to the searches at issue,
which were conducted as a Joint venture between United States
and Mexican officers. The court further held that the searches
failed to comply with the Amendment's Warrant Clause, which
20. The searches-are described in the district court's unpublished opinion,
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, No. 86-0107-JLI-Crim. (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5,
1987), and, in abbreviated form, in the Ninth Circuit's decision upholding the trial
court, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988). The district court's opinion is available only
in unpaginated form, as Appendix B to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. United States v. VerdugoUrquidez (No. 88-1353), availablein LEXIS, Genfed Library. Briefs File [hereinafter
Verdugo (S.D. Cal.)].

21. 856 F.2d at 1216 n.2.
22. Id. at 1226.
23. Id. The Playa del Sol search Is not mentioned in the Court of Appeals
opinion, but is described in the unpaglnated opinion of the district court.
Verdugo (S.D. Cal.), supra note 20. This Article's description of the searches Is
taken from the district court's findings of fact, which are largely reproduced in the
Court of Appeals opinion, 856 F.2d at 1226-27.
24. Verdugo (S.D. Cal.), supra note 20. The Ninth Circuit summarized the
district court's conclusions regarding the Mexicall, but not the Playa del Sol,
search. 856 F.2d at 1217.
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requires police, except in exceptional circumstances, to obtain
warrants for all searches. Even had a warrant not been required,
the court held, the execution of the searches nevertheless violated
in several ways the Amendment's requirement that searches be
conducted "reasonably": the searches were unconstitutionally
general in scope; they occurred after midnight; and the agents
failed to leave receipts or to prepare contemporaneous
5
inventories.2
The United States fied an interlocutory appeal of the district
court's ruling. 2 6 It argued that the Fourth Amendment did not
protect Verdugo, a Mexican national, from a United States search
in Mexico. In the alternative, the United States argued that, even
if the Fourth Amendment extended to Verdugo, the evidence
nevertheless should have been admitted, because the DEA agents
reasonably relied on assurances of Mexican officials that the
search was permissible under Mexican law, and then carried out
the search in a reasonable manner. 2 7 A divided Ninth Circuit

panel affirmed the district court's ruling,28 and the United States
petitioned for certiorari.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth
Circuit's holding, with six Justices in three separate opinions
concluding that the evidence against Verdugo was wrongfuly
suppressed. 2 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy) wrote the "Opinion of the Court;"
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Stevens
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Brennan
and Blackmun wrote separate dissents, with Justice Marshall
joining Brennan's opinion. 3 0
The potpourri of opinions leaves the scope and precedential
effect of the Court's decision uncertain. The principal problem is
the lack of a true majority opinion: the opinion denominated the
"Opinion of the Court" was not joined in much of its reasoning, or
even in all its conclusions, by a majority of the Court. Only three
Justices, White, O'Connor, and Scalia, fully joined the Chief
Justice's opinion. Neither of the two Justices who concurred fully
agreed with the scope or reasoning of what Chief Justice
Rehnquist asserted to be the Court's "holding": Justice Stevens
concurred only in the judgment, and Justice Kennedy, who
purported to join the Opinion of the Court, nevertheless explicitly
25.

856 F.2d at 1217; Verdugo (S.D. Cal.), supra note 20.

26. 856 F.2d at 1215.
27. Id.
28. Id. (majority opinion); Id. at 1230 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
29. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
30. Id. at 261 (Opinion of the Court); d. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring); d.
at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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repudiated Rehnquist's central argument in favor of a narrower
holding. 3 1 Consequently, the Court's decision rests on two
partly
irreconcilable
at
least
independent
and
rationales--Rehnquist's and Kennedy's-with little apparent
common ground between them. Further, even if it represents the
judgment of a majority of the Court, the scope of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's "holding" and the rationale on which it rests are
unclear. For these reasons, the Verdugo decision leaves lower
courts with a certain amount of flexibility in construing its scope
and effect-a flexibility, however, which they have failed to
32
exercise.
The two longest and most significant opinions in Verdugo,
those by the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan, reflect sharply
One
differing traditions of United States constitutionalism.
tradition, embraced by Rehnquist, reads the Constitution
narrowly, as a "compact" that extends rights only to "members" of
The more expansive tradition,
the "national community."
embraced by Justice Brennan, would have the Constitution
extend its protections wherever the United States wields power.

Justice Kennedy's shorter concurring opinion embraces a third
tradition, one which proposes a pragmatic and case-specific
balancing test that weighs "what process is due" when the United
States acts abroad.3 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion begins by distinguishing
between Fourth Amendment rights and the trial rights
Whereas Fifth
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 3 4
Amendment rights are exercised at trial, a violation of the Fourth
Amendment is "fully accomplished" at the time a search or seizure
takes place. Thus, "if there were a constitutional violation [in the
35
Verdugo case], it occurred solely in Mexico."
The Fourth Amendment is different in another respect,
In contrast to the Fifth and Sixth
Rehnquist added.
Amendments, which extend their protections categorically to all
criminal
defendants,3 6
the
text
of
the
Fourth
Amendment-guaranteeing "[t]he right of the people to be secure

31.
32.

See Infra text accompanying notes 46-51.
See Infra note 137.

33. These approaches are placed in historical context by Neuman, supra
note 12.
34. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 264.
35. Id.
36. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person... shall be held to answer...
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. V (emphasis added). The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).

1994]

AN INTERNATIONAL FOURTHAMENDMENT

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures"-"extends its reach only to
'the people.'" In the Chief Justice's view, "the people" is a term of
art selectively employed in the Constitution to refer to a "class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connections with this country to be
Verdugo, a Mexican
considered part of that community."37
national brought unwillingly into the United States as a prisoner
shortly before the searches in question, had not developed the
kind of substantial connection that could qualify him as a
member of this "national community."3 8 Rehnquist noted that
the framers of the Constitution, as well as their contemporaries,
had no such concern for the rights of nonresident aliens, and that
courts over the years had declined to extend any such rights.39
Additionally, the Chief Justice concluded, "significant and
deleterious consequences" could follow from bestowing Fourth
If the Fourth
Amendment rights on nonresident aliens. 40
Amendment could be invoked by criminal defendants such as
Verdugo, it also could be invoked against military operations
abroad. 4 1 Moreover, if the Fourth Amendment could be invoked
defensively as a means to suppress evidence, it could also be
invoked offensively, in the form of actions for damages. 4 2
Application of the Fourth Amendment under such circumstances
could significantly disrupt the political branches' ability to
respond to foreign situations implicating the national interest.4 3
Trying to figure out where the courts would draw the line between
law enforcement and national security operations would "plunge
[the President and Congress] into a sea of uncertainty as to what
might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures
Given this uncertainty and the risks
conducted abroad.""

inherent in the international arena, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that restrictions on law enforcement abroad must of
45
necessity be imposed, if at all, by the political branches.
37.

United States v. Verdugo-Urquldez, 494 U.S. at 265.

38.

Id. at 271-72.

39. Id. at 266-69. As the Chief Justice noted, one line of cases extends
constitutional rights to aliens within the United States, and a few other cases
extend constitutional rights to citizens abroad, but no Supreme Court case has

extended constitutional rights to aliens outside United States territory. Id. at
268-73. Justice Brennan noted in response that, while the Supreme Court had
not extended Fourth Amendment protections to aliens abroad, neither has it
precluded such an extension. Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

273.
273-74.
274.
275.
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Justice Kennedy, while purporting to join Rehnquist's
Opinion of the Court,46 in fact went out of his way to repudiate
the Chief Justice's "membership" approach. In his view, the
Fourth Amendment's reference to "the right of the people," if
anything, served to underscore the importance of the right
granted, rather than to restrict the category of persons who might
assert it.47 Justice Kennedy, however, made even more clear his
opposition to the view of constitutional universalists, perhaps
including Justice Brennan, who argue "that every provision of the
Constitution must always be deemed automatically applicable to
American citizens in every part of the world." 48 In between the
two poles of Rehnquist and Brennan, Justice Kennedy staked out
a flexible middle ground, drawing on a classic concurrence by
Justice Harlan:
not that the Constitution "does not apply" overseas, but
that there are provisions in the Constitution which do not
necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place
....
[Tihere is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as
a condition precedent to exercising power over Americans
overseas, must exercise it subject to all the guarantees of
the Constitution, no matter what the conditions and
considerations are that would make adherence to a specific
guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous. 4 9
...

In this case, Justice Kennedy concluded, the circumstances of
extraterritorial law enforcement-notably the absence of local
Judicial officials available to issue warrants, the differing
conceptions of reasonableness and privacy prevalent abroad, and
the need to cooperate with foreign officials-combined to make
adherence to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
"impracticable and anomalous."5 0
Notably, Justice Kennedy did not reach the broader issues of
constitutional scope that occupied Chief Justice Rehnquist. His
opinion, having found the warrant requirement "impracticable
and anomalous," did not proceed, as the Chief Justice's did, to
the conclusion that the entire Fourth Amendment stops at the
46. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Although some explanation of my views Is
appropriate given the diMculties of this case, I do not believe they depart in
fundamental respects from the opinion of the Court, which Ijoin.").
47. Id. at 276.
48. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). "Universalist" approaches, resting on the natural rights background
of the United States constitutional tradition, go beyond municipal law approaches
to extend constitutional protections globally, to every person and every place. See
generally Neuman, supra note 12, at 916-17, 982-84.
49. 494 U.S. at 277-78 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
50.

Id. at 278.
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water's edge for noncitizens. 5 1 This is true as well of the oneparagraph concurrence filed by Justice Stevens, who confined
himself to the proposition that "the Warrant Clause [does not
have] any application to searches of noncitizens' homes in foreign
jurisdictions because American magistrates have no power to
authorize such searches."5 2 Because the two concurring Justices
confined their holdings to the inapplicability of the Warrant
Clause, support for Rehnquist's broad statement of the holding
amounts to only four Justices-that is, the Chief Justice and the
three Justices (White, O'Connor, and Scalia) who joined the
plurality opinion in its entirety.5 3
Justice Brennan, in dissent, set out a view of the
Constitution sharply at variance to those advanced by either Chief
Justice Rehnquist or Justice Kennedy. Justice Brennan invoked
principles of "mutuality" and "fundamental fairness" in support of
the view that the Constitution applies wherever the United States
"Fundamental fairness," he
exercises its legal muscle abroad."
reasoned, mandates that whenever the United States imposes

"societal obligations" on foreign nationals in the form of

compliance with the law, the United States is obliged to respect

certain correlative rights.5 5 Simply stated, "[ilf we expect aliens to
obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey
our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and punish
Verdugo thus was entitled to Fourth Amendment
them."58
protection because the United States government, in investigating
him and then attempting to hold him accountable under United
States criminal laws, "has treated him as a member of our
community for purposes of enforcing our laws. He has become,
quite literally, one of the governed."5 7
Justice Brennan's emphasis on the mutuality of societal
obligations and rights places his reasoning within what have been
dubbed "municipal law"58 approaches to the Constitution-those

51.

See Id.

(Kennedy, J., concurring);

id. at 294 n.13

(Brennan, J.,

dissenting) (*Justice Kennedy. . . never explains why the reasonableness clause,
as opposed to the Warrant Clause, would not apply to searches abroad.").
52. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
53. This point has been made by most commentators on the decision. See,
e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.8(g) (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1993);
Neuman, supra note 12, at 972 & n.378; Ruth Wedgwood, InternationalDeclsion,
84 Am. J. INT'L L. 747, 750 (1990); New York State Bar Ass'n Intl Litig. Comm.,
Commercial & Fed. Litig. Section, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Nonresident
Aliens, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 493, 497-98 (1991) [hereinafter New York Bar Report].
54. 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. "Municipal" is used here in its traditional international law sense to
mean domestic, as opposed to international, law. See Infra note 101.
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approaches that deem rights to be prerequisites for political or
legal obligations.5 9 Like Chief Justice Rehnquist's "membershipbased" model, this model derives its force from a social contract
understanding of constitutionalism; however, the two models offer
different explanations of how one becomes a beneficiary of the
social contract. For the Chief Justice, one becomes a beneficiary
when one has accumulated suffcient ties to be considered a
member of a "national community," which guarantees members
particular rights in exchange for certain communal obligations.
Under the municipal law approach espoused by Justice Brennan,
by contrast, guarantees of rights are not a function of
"membership;" rather, rights are extended transaction by
transaction, in direct relation to obligations imposed by the
government.
In parts of his dissent, Justice Brennan appeared to go
beyond the principle of "mutuality"60 described above and toward
a universalist approach of the sort to which Justice Kennedy
objected.
At one point, he suggested that freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures might be a natural right,

inherent in the people and predating the Bill of Rights.61

At

another point, he also suggested that the Fourth Amendment
might apply abroad in situations beyond the law enforcement
context, such as to restrict peacetime national security operations
abroad.62
Justice Blackmun, in a three-paragraph dissent, accepted
Justice Brennan's core principle of "mutuality" but separated
himself from his co-dissenter in two ways. First, he tried to rein
in the universalist tendencies of Justice Brennan's opinion by
sharpening the test of when the Constitution should apply. The
limiting principle, Justice Blackmun argued, should be the
exercise of "sovereign authority" abroad. The exercise of sovereign
authority, as in law enforcement operations, should trigger the
Fourth Amendment; the mere "exercise of power abroad," as in
military operations, should not.6 3 Second, Justice Blackmun
differed from Justice Brennan on the matter of warrants. He

59. See Neuman, supra note 12, at 919; see also Lea Brilmayer, International
Law In American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2297-98 (1991)

(finding governments "limited by basic principles of political legitimacy whether
they consent to these limits or not").
60. 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

61. Id. at 288 (noting that the Framers "did not purport to 'create' rights" but
instead "designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing
rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing.").

62. Id. at 292 (noting that the exception for exigent circumstances would
likely minimize the warrant requirement's application to "non-law-enforcement
activities... implicating national security").
63. 494 U.S. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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concluded, as did Justice Stevens, that "an American magistrate's
lack of power to authorize a search abroad renders the Warrant
Clause inapplicable to the search of a noncitizen's residence
outside this country."6 4 He nevertheless held that the Fourth
65
Amendment required the search to be "reasonable."
Accordingly, he would have remanded the matter to the trial court
for a determination of whether probable cause for the searches
existed.
In sum, the outstanding feature of the Verdugo decision is
the Supreme Court's fragmentation over fundamental issues of
the Constitution's nature and scope. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
"membership" approach garnered only a plurality of four Justices
and is theoretically irreconcilable with Justice Kennedy's
contextually sensitive approach. Both, in turn, are fundamentally
at odds with the "mutuality" or "sovereignty" approaches of
Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Additionally, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's purported holding-that the entire Fourth
Amendment terminates at the water's edge for individuals lacking
"substantial connection" with the United States national
community-found support from only three other Justices. The
sole proposition to garner a majority of the Justices (seven
Justices--all except Justices Brennan and Marshall) was that the
Amendment's warrant requirement is inapplicable abroad. The
applicability of the Amendment's first clause, guaranteeing "the
right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable searches
and seizures," remained an open question.68 Clearly, in Verdugo,
the Supreme Court had just begun to wrestle with the
complexities of searches and seizures abroad.
B. Evaluating the Court'sApproaches
Commentary on the Verdugo decision has been extensive.
The vast majority of commentators have taken aim at the Chief
Justice's textual reading of the Constitution, arguing, as did
Justice Brennan, that the Constitution generally should follow the
United States whenever the government acts beyond national

64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
See tnfra note 139.
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borders.67 The Chief Justice's approach has garnered almost no
support.6
1. The Rehnquist Approach: "Membership"
Much of the commentary on Verdugo has focused on the
deficiency of the Chief Justice's reasoning. Three points, in
particular, have provided a focus of attack: Rehnquist's textual
analysis, finding the phrase "the people" to be a "term of art;"6 9
his freewheeling use of history; and the unnecessarily broad
sweep of his opinion, containing language that could threaten the
settled rights of aliens within the United States.
67. Articles criticizing the Chief Justice's approach include Abraham
Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialAbductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run
Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151 (1991) (attacking Rehnquist's approach in context of
United States abductions of foreign suspects); Gibney, supra note 15 (urging
extraterritorlal enforcement of domestic constitutional standards); Andreas F.

Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and InternationalLaw,
Continued, 84 Am. J. INT'L L. 444, 455-58, 491-93 (1990) (recommending that
United States and foreign law be enforced); Neuman, supra note 12, at 976-91
(recommending modified version of Brennan's "mutuality" approach); New York
Bar Report, supra note 53 (criticizing Rehnquist's textual approach and urging
that it not be used to diminish aliens' rights within United States); Wedgwood,
supra note 53 (recommending "rule of reason").
Student notes and comments criticizing Rehnquist's approach include Jon A.
Dobson, Note, Verdugo-Urquildez: A Move Away from Belief In the Universal Pre.
existing Rights ofAll People, 36 S.D. L. REv. 120 (1991); Gal T. Kikawa, Note, How
the MaJorlty Stumbled, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 369 (1991); Janet E. Mitchell, Note, The
Selective Application of the Fourth Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 289 (1991);
Mary Lynn Nicholas, Note, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Restricting the
Borders of the FourthAmendment, 14 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 267 (1990-91); Victor C.
Romero, Note, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented
Immigrants' Rights After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999 (1992).
68.' For a rare article expressing (qualified) support of Rehnquist's approach,
see Paul B. Stephan, III, InternationalLaw in the Supreme Court, 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. ANN. 133, 134 (hailing plurality opinion as "advanc[ingi a conception of
international law as a body of contingent principles derived from
intergovernmental bargaining"). Two earlier articles by Professor Stephan appear
to have provided some of the theoretical underpinning for the Chief Justice's
opinion, and were cited by the Justice Department in its briefs. See Paul B.
Stephan, III, Constitutional Lntts on the Struggle Against InternationalTerrorisnm
Revisiting the Rights of OverseasAliens, 19 CONN. L. REv. 831 (1987) [hereinafter
Terrorism]; Paul B. Stephan, Il, Constltutional Limits on InternationalRendition of
Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777 (1980) [hereinafter International
Rendition].
In addition, a few student notes published before the Supreme Court's
Verdugo opinion provided anticipatory support for Rehnqulst's approach. See,
e.g., Patrick Dooley, Note, The Unreasonableness of Requiring a Wanrrantfor
Searches of Non-residentAliens in a Foreign Country: United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 355 (1990).
69. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
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In analyzing the text of the Constitution, the Chief Justice
attempted to distinguish between the framers' use of the words
"the people" (in seven places throughout the Constitution) and the
and Sixth Amendments) of the words
alternative use (in the Fifth
"person" and "accused."70 The Chief Justice concluded that the
use of "the people" by the framers was intended to restrict the
scope of the provisions in which it appears to "persons who are
part of a national community.'71 As more than one commentator
has noted, the text of the Constitution does not support such a
conclusion; an analysis of the constitutional text reveals instead
that "[t]he framers do not appear to have used the phrase 'the
right of the people' in situations involving any rights or privileges
that are distinct from other enumerated liberties such that any
different scope of application can readily be inferred."7 2
Other commentators have noted the ahistorical nature of the
Chief Justice's "suggestion that the constitutional structure of the
United States was meant to have as its beneficiaries only United
States citizens and resident aliens."7 3 As one commentator has
noted, while the framers did not extend political rights to aliens,
they nevertheless gave attention to protecting aliens' rights under

the law of nations. For instance, Article III of the Constitution, by
creating foreign diversity jurisdiction, allowed foreign creditors to
recover their debts in United States courts; additionally, the first
Judiciary Act provided that aliens could sue in federal court for
torts under the law of nations.7 4
Others have stressed the destructive impact the Chief
Justice's opinion could have on the rights of aliens within the
United States-in particular, Rehnquist's remark, in dictum, that
case law apparently guaranteeing Fourth Amendment rights to
illegal aliens within the United States was in fact "not dispositive"
of the matter.7 5 This dictum, implying a reopening of the issue of

70. Id. at 265-66.
71. Id. at 265.
72. New York Bar Report, supra note 53, at 502. For an analysis of the use
of the phrase "the people" in the first ten amendments, see id. at 500-03. See
also Abramovsky, supra note 67, at 184; Nicholas, supra note 67, at 296.
73. Wedgwood, supra note 53, at 753; see also Neuman, supra note 12, at
927-38 (drafters of Bill of Rights did not take care to distinguish between
respective rights of citizens and persons; the issue was not raised sharply until a
decade later in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798).
74. Wedgwood, supra note 53, at 753 & nn.26-27. The Alien Tort Statute is
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
75. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272 (stating that Court's
previous opinion in INS v. Lotpz-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), "where a
majority of Justices assumed that the Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens
in the United States," was not "dispositive of how the Court would rule on a
Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States if such a claim
The Chief Justice's suggestion that the Court
were squarely before us.").
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aliens' previously settled rights, suggests the potential latent in
Chief Justice Rehnquist's social compact approach for a fullfledged assault on the rights of noncitizens within, as well as
outside, the United States.7 6
Perhaps the most disturbing aspects of the Chief Justice's
opinion, however, lie not in the specific deficiencies of its
reasoning, but instead are inherent in his approach. First, the
Chief Justice resurrected a disturbing tradition of constitutional
interpretation that would confine constitutional protections solely
to those who are "members" of the national community, leaving
nonmembers without a remedy. Second (a concern that has not
received the attention of commentators but which is at the heart
of this Article's critique), by leaving the targets of transnational
law enforcement efforts not only outside the United States "social
compact" but outside the law of any state, the Chief Justice
essentially would place these individuals outside the realm of law.
While any number of states may search their homes or seize their
belongings, they may invoke the legal protections of no state in
the United States courts.
a. The Membership Tradition
The "membership" tradition that the Chief Justice invoked is
one of two or three dominant traditions that have developed over
the last two centuries in response to basic questions of
constitutional scope. 7 7 These traditions, it should be noted, rely
more on political theory, on broad interpretations of the nature
and character of the Constitution as a whole, than on any
reconsider the application of the Fourth Amendment to aliens within the United
States is vigorously critiqued in New York Bar Report, supra note 53, at 498-513,
and in Romero, supra note 67.
76. See Abramovsky, supra note 67, at 184.
77. These traditions have been analyzed extensively In recent years In
response to the expansion of United States law enforcement activity abroad. For
articles written before the Supreme Court's Verdugo decision that explore these
traditions, see, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitutionas Compact and as Conscience:
Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11 (1985);

Jules Lobel, Rights-Here and There: The ConstitutionAbroad, 83 Am. J. INTL L.
871 (1989); John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Prlnciplesfor the Application of
ConstitutionalLimitations to FederalAction, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoLY 287 (1985);
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the
United States, 20 VA. J. INTL L. 741 (1980); Stephan, Terrorism, supra note 68;
Stephan, InternationalRendition, supra note 68; Roszell Dulany Hunter, IV, Note,
The ExtraternltorlalApplication of the Constitution-UnalienableRights?, 72 VA. L.
REv. 649 (1986). In the discussion that follows I rely on the more recent, and
more comprehensive, analysis of Professor Gerald Neuman following the Verdugo
decision. Neuman, supra note 12. Neuman analyzes three traditions (which he
dubs the "membership," "global due process," and "municipal-law" traditions)
which provide the theoretical grounding for the opinions by Justices Rehnquist,
Kennedy, and Brennan respectively.
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particular constitutional provisions, for the Constitution itself

provides little, if any, textual guidance in this area.78
Justice

Rehnquist's

membership

approach,

in

Chief

particular,

represents a restrictive version of the social contract tradition
that identifies a prescribed class of "members" as the proper

Undergirding the membership79
that international relations
notions:
are
Hobbesian
tradition
beneficiaries of the contract.

constitute a state of war; that a state's only external obligations
are those resulting from explicit promises; that rights are granted
exclusively to members; that, until granted membership, aliens
are outsiders to the social contract of a particular state, and thus
in a condition of war.80
The membership view of the Constitution has been invoked
on numerous occasions throughout United States history, many
of which have acquired notoriety with the clarity of hindsight.81
Echoes of Chief Justice Rehnquist's language sound, for instance,
in the arguments of the Federalists in support of the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798, during which Federalist representatives
announced to Congress that "the Constitution was made for
citizens, not for aliens, who of consequence have no rights under
it."82 Echoes can be heard again in Chief Justice Taney's opinion
in the Dred Scott case, in which he drew on social contract
analysis to conclude that blacks could never be part of "the
The California
people" protected under the Constitution.8 3
legislature repeatedly attempted to implement a similar approach
to noncitizens during the latter half of the nineteenth century,
passing scores of measures intended to relegate Chinese
immigrants to second-class status--an effort decisively repudiated

78. See Henkin, supra note 77, at 30. Chief Justice Rehnquist, of course,
tried to ground his approach in textual exegesis, but his apparent failure to do so
convincingly underscores the lack of textual support for such attempts.
79. The Chief Justice did not refer by name to any such tradition. Others
have generally referred to the tradition that the Chief Justice invoked as the
"social compact" tradition. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d
1214, 1218-21 (9th Cir. 1988); Abramovsky, supra note 67, at 181-90; Stephan,
International Rendton, supra note 68, at 783-85. Since I follow Neuman in
finding both Rehnquist's and Brennan's approaches to be versions of social
contract theory, I prefer to use the term "membership" to avoid confusion when
describing the Chief Justice's approach.
80. See Neuman, supra note 12, at 923, 984-87; and see THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 360 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1985) ("the Infliction of what evil soever, on
an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Commonwealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of
Nature").
81. See Neuman, supranote 12, at 917-18, 929-34, 940-41.
82. 9 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 2987 (1799). See also Neuman, supra note 12, at
929-34.
83. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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by the Supreme Court in groundbreaking cases such as Ylck Wo
v. Hopklns8 4 and Wong Wing v. United States.8 5
The membership tradition has provided a crucial foundation

not only for efforts to deny rights to aliens and non-whites within
the United States, but also for Supreme Court efforts confining
the reach of the Constitution to the mainland United States.
Membership reasoning provides the underpinning for Supreme
Court decisions in this area such as the Insular Cases86
(establishing a framework of second-class status for overseas
territories), In re Ross87 (upholding the summary trial of a United
States seaman before an offshore consular court on the ground
that "[tihe Constitution can have no operation in another
8 9 (denying enemy
country"),8 8 and Johnson v. Elsentrager
soldiers
imprisoned abroad access to United States courts ).90
Kinship with this Hobbesian tradition, as Gerald Neuman
notes, is not hard to find in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Verdugo
opinion:
in his reliance, for example, on "the people" as
demarcating "a class of persons who are part of a national
community."9 1 and in his insistence on the rightlessness of those
who are not members.9 2 It may also be perceived in Rehnquist's
invocation of the Insular Cases, In re Ross, and Johnson v.

84. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
85. 163 U.S. 228 (1896); see also Neuman, supra note 12, at 941-42 &
nn.174-80.
86. This refers to the series of cases, from DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1
(1901), to Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), that established the

constitutional and legal status of the overseas territories, Including Puerto Rico
and the Philippines. See Neuman, supra note 12, at 957-64.
87. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
88.
89.

Id. at 464.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).

90. The principal defender of the tradition in recent years has been Professor
Paul Stephan. In a series of articles over the last decade and a half (cited supra
note 68), he has argued for the members-only approach as the appropriately
hard-headed response to the threats of international terrorism and drug
trafficking. Stephan invokes the "traditional view of the Constitution as a
compact between the people of the United States and its government, creating
enforceable rights and duties running between each of the parties." Stephan,
Intematonal Rendition, supra note 68, at 783. Taking the contract metaphor
literally and drawing on modem contract theory, Stephan queries whether the
compact should be seen "as obligating the government to assume a duty with
respect to some class of third parties, thereby creating rights in the latter." His
answer is that "[tlhe benefits to the people of the United States derived from the
governments assumption of such a duty should be substantial and unmitigated
before that duty is Imposed," and that in fact "the benefits ... might not be great
while the costs could be considerable." Id. at 783-84. See also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1231-37 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
91. United States v. Verduqo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
92. Id.
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Elsentrager,93 and in his insistence that the only limitations on
United States actions abroad should be self-imposed,9 4 and that
"deleterious consequences" will result if the United States accepts
constitutional restrictions on its freedom of action abroad. 95
b. Outside the Realm of Law?
The second general area of concern mentioned above relates
to Verdugo's effect from an international, rather than a
This concern, which has not
constitutional, perspective.
previously been explored in the academic literature, provides the
foundation for this Article's critique. The Verdugo Court, and
subsequent commentators, have approached the problems raised
by the case from an essentially domestic perspective-that is, they
have looked at the United States constitutional framework in a
vacuum and have asked whether the framework should be
expanded or contracted to encompass the factual situation
presented in Verdugo.
The perspective this Article proposes is a different one. It
suggests examining Verdugo's situation from an international,
rather than a national, perspective, and taking note that Verdugo,
as a Mexican target of United States law enforcement, exists
within two legal frameworks, not one, and is acted upon by two
sets of state actors, not one. From this perspective, the impact of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion on Verdugo's situation appears
even more dire. Verdugo and subsequent targets of United
States-instigated, transnational law enforcement efforts, will find
themselves not merely outside the ambit of the United States Bill
of Rights, but also outside the ambit of whatever protections the
search-and-seizure law of their own state provides. At least as far
as searches and seizures are concerned, these defendants will
find themselves in a uniquely unprotected position: They wil lack
the protection not only of the law of the state that is prosecuting
them (the United States), but of the law of their own state as well.

This rightlessness occurs because, as discussed in Part IV below,
United States courts do not apply the Fourth Amendment to the
acts of foreign officials and do not enforce foreign search-andseizure laws.9 6
That defendants in Verdugo's position are now essentially
international outcasts carries more than theoretical force. In
Verdugo, for example, the search of Verdugo's residences, on its
face, violated the Mexican Constitution, Article 16 of which states:
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 273.
See tnfra part IV.A.1.
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No one shall be molested in his person, family, domicile,
papers, or possessions except by virtue of a written order of
the competent authority stating the legal grounds and
justification for the action taken.... Every search warrant
...
can be issued only by judicial authority and ... must
97
be in writing.
The district court briefly addressed the potential applicability of
the Mexican Constitution to the Verdugo case and concluded that
DEA agents should have sought advice on Mexican constitutional
law, in particular on whether "exigent circumstances" excused the
need for obtaining a warrant. 98 Verdugo's attorney raised this
argument in his brief to the Supreme Court, 9 9 but the Supreme

Court did not address the issue. As a result, a search that
apparently violated the domestic search-and-seizure standards of
both the United States and Mexico was held to neither standard.
Essentially, the Court concluded, no law applied.
2. The Brennan Approach: "Mutuality"
Justice Brennan's approach, stressing the mutuality of
obligations and rights under the Constitution, springs from a
tradition equally longstanding, and somewhat less tarnished,
than that invoked by the Chief Justice. As applied by Justice
Brennan to the Fourth Amendment context, however, the
approach is equally problenatic, as discussed below.
a. The Municipal Law Tradition
The "municipal law" traditionlOO is rooted, like the
membership approach, in the social contract tradition. Unlike

the membership approach, however, which views the Constitution
as a compact bestowing benefits on "members" and excluding
"outsiders," the municipal law approach views the Constitution as
"fundamental municipal law,"1'o
imposing limitations on
97. MEX. CONST. art. 16, reprinted In CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Albert P. Blausteln & Gilbert H. Flanz eds. 1988). The Department of
Justice perfunctorily contested the illegality of the search under Mexican law on
the ground that a further clause of Article 16 permits *administrative officials" to
enter private homes "for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether the sanitary
and police regulations have been complied with." Reply Brief for the United
States, supranote 3, at "10-11.
98. Verdugo (S.D. Cal.), supra note 20.
99. Brief for Respondent Verdugo, supra note 3, at *22-24.
100. Labelled so by Professor Neuman. Neuman, supra note 12, at 918-19 &
passim. For other invocations or examinations of this tradition, although not by
this name, see the articles cited supra note 77.
101. As noted above, supra note 58, the term "municipal law" in this context
is used in the sense of the domestic law of a given state, as opposed to
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government coextensive with the powers it grants. Under this
model, the Constitution extends its protections, by virtue of what
Brennan calls "mutuality" or "fundamental fairness," to any who
fall under the reach of municipal law. Constitutional protections
are extended on a transaction-by-transaction basis; as far as
power is exercised, just so far are constitutional strictures
imposed. Thus, the constitutional "sword" and "shield" are
coextensive.
This municipal law tradition harks back to the Jeffersonian
Republicans, who developed the position in response to the
02
Federalists' arguments on behalf of the Alien and Sedition Acts.1
It finds its fullest expression in two seminal opinions, one from
the 1880s, the other from the 1950s. These two opinions, Yick
Wo v. Hopkins'0 3 and Reid v. Covert,'0 4 have provided the

foundation for much of the subsequent jurisprudence regarding
the Constitution's reach.
Ylck Wo, which clearly established the rights of aliens within
the United States,l 0 5 represented the culmination of a long
struggle between the federal courts and California over the rights
Overturning yet another California
of Chinese immigrants.
attempt to persecute the Chinese, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to the protection of
Rather, its guarantees are universal in their
citizens.108
the United States,
application, extending to all persons within
07
regardless of race, color, or nationality.'
What Yick Wo accomplished for resident aliens, Reid v.
CovertlO8 did for United States citizens abroad, decisively rejecting
the Hobbesian tradition embodied in In re Ross.' 0 9 In Reid, the
Supreme Court took up the habeas corpus petitions of two
widows of servicemen in England and Japan who had been
convicted by courts martial of murdering their husbands.
Examining the argument of Ross that the Constitution does not
apply abroad, Justice Black rejected the idea "that when the
United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the

international or natural law. Neuman derives the term as a description of a
model of constitutionalism from the Jeffersonians' use of the term in the debates
on the Alien Act. See Neuman, supra note 12, at 918 n.42.
102. Id. at 927-29, 934-38.
103. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
104. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
105. See Henkin, supra note 77, at 15-18.
106. Ytck Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
107. Id.
108. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
109. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
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Bill of Rights."110 He stated, In words that have been widely
quoted:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.
Its power and authority have no other source. It can only
act in accordance with all the limitations Imposed by the
Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish
a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights
and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life
and liberty should not be stripped away just because he
happens to be in another land.1 1 1
YIck Wo and Reid have provided the foundation on which rest
the current protections, respectively, for aliens within the United
States and for United States citizens abroad.112 With his opinion
in Verdugo, Justice Brennan placed himself squarely within this
"municipal law" tradition. Citing Reid for the proposition that the
United States "can only act in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution,"' 1 3 Justice Brennan deduced the
principle of mutuality: that Verdugo is entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections because the United States "has treated
him as a member of our community for purposes of enforcing our
laws."1 1 4
Rather than ask, as did Chief Justice Rehnquist,
whether the defendant is a "member of our national community"
and thus deserving of constitutional protection, Justice Brennan
asked:
Has the United States imposed obligations on this
particular individual in this particular transaction? If the answer
is "yes," Justice Brennan concluded, then for purposes of that
particular transaction that individual is "one of the governed" and
accordingly entitled to the full range of United States
constitutional protections.
b. Problems of Application

Justice Brennan's approach, requiring a mutuality of rights
and obligations in each transaction between the United States
and "the governed," is a more generous approach than Chief
Justice Rehnquist's members-only approach, and one seemingly
more consonant with the web of mutual rights and obligations

110. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5 (Black, J., joined by Warren, C.J., Douglas, J., and
Brennan, J.) (footnotes omitted).
111. Id.at 6.
112. See Henkin, supra note 77, at 15-18, 22-24.
113. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
114. Id. at 284.
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that make up our "constituted" system of government.li 5 As
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy pointed out,
however, the approach, as applied in this context, is highly
problematic. Justice Brennan apparently assumed that, because
the Fourth Amendment is to apply abroad, it should apply in its
entirety, with all the detailed rules and practices applicable to
searches within the United States.1 1 6 By insisting on a wholesale
transplantation of the Fourth Amendment abroad, Justice
Brennan provided a comfortable target for Chief Jutice
Rehnquist's and Justice Kennedy's policy arguments.
I. Warrants
Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Kennedy's primary
focus was the warrant requirement for foreign searches. These
Justices, however, did not direct their heaviest fire at the most
vulnerable aspects of extraterritorial warrants, but aimed instead
at less vulnerable aspects. For example, as one of three reasons
why the warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico, Justice
Kennedy cited "Itihe absence of local judges or magistrates
available to issue warrants."11 7 This objection loses much of its
force in light of the availability of "telephone warrants" under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. A provision of this rule,
promulgated in 1977 and recently expanded, allows warrants to
be issued upon sworn oral testimony over the telephone, instead
of upon written affidavit, "[l]f the circumstances make it
reasonable to dispense, in whole or in part, with a written
affidavit."" 8 Although law enforcement agents overseas still

115. See articles cited supra note 67. Chief Justice Rehnqust's approach,

leaving criminal defendants wholly outside the search-and-seizure laws of their
own state and of the United States, invites a response such as that made by
Justice Black in his dissent in Etsentrager: "Perhaps, as some nations believe,

there is merit in leaving the administration of criminal laws to executive and
military agencies completely free from judicial scrutiny. Our Constitution has
emphatically expressed a contrary policy." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
797-98 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
116. See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 294 ("It]he Warrant Clause would serve the
same primary functions abroad as it does domestically, and I see no reason to
distinguish between foreign and domestic searches."). In applying domestic
standards to extraterritorial searches, Justice Brennan merely followed the Ninth
Circuitfs opinion in Verdugo, which asserted that to do otherwise "would be to
treat foreign searches differently from domestic searches just because they are
foreign." 856 F.2d at 1230.
117. 494 U.S. at 278.
118. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A). Under this procedure, the afflant may give a
sworn oral statement to the magistrate over the telephone, or may, following a
1993 amendment to the rule, transmit a sworn statement by facsimile
transmission. Id. & 1993 advisory committee note. The statement is recorded
and transcribed, and is deemed an affidavit for purposes of issuing the search
warrant If the magistrate approves the issuance of the warrant, he causes an

356

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:329

would face the difficulty of obtaining secure telephone lines to
transmit sensitive information to magistrates in the United
States, nonetheless the availability of this device should alleviate

much of the burden of obtaining warrants overseas. 1 1 9

A second objection, raised by Justices Stevens and Blackmun
as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist, also lacks substance. This is
the argument that the Warrant Clause cannot be read as

mandating warrants in foreign jurisdictions because United
States magistrates lack the power to issue extraterritorial
warrants. 120 The Justices were referring to the fact that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize federal judges and
magistrates to issue search warrants only within their own federal
districts, with a limited exception for persons or property fleeing
from the district.121 However, as Justice Brennan correctly
responded, this statutory restriction cannot be seen as restricting
the scope of a constitutional requirement. "Congress," Justice
Brennan noted, "cannot define the contours of the Constitution. If
the Warrant Clause applies, Congress cannot excise the Clause
from the Constitution by failing to
provide a means for United
12 2
States agents to obtain a warrant."
I
original search warrant to be prepared, and he also orally authorizes the officer
requesting the warrant to prepare a "duplicate original warrant," which may be
used to execute the search as if it were the original warrant. Id, See generally 2
LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 4.3(c); Paul D. Beecher, Comment, Oral Search Warrants:
A New Standardof WarrantAvailability, 21 UCLA L. REv. 691 (1974).
119. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c(2)[A), 1993 advisory committee note ("the Rule
should thus encourage law enforcement officers to seek a warrant"); Berlin
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 160 (D.D.C. 1976) (requiring
telephone warrant by United States officials prior to wiretap overseas). It should
be noted, however, that while the Advisory Committee and the courts have been
enthusiastic about this procedure, some prosecutors have apparently been
reluctant to employ it. See United States v. Berick, 710 F.2d 1035, 1038-40 &
nn.4, 10 (5th Cr. 1983), cert dented, 464 U.S. 899, 918 (1983).
120. 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); and see Id. at 274 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (warrant would be "dead letter"
outside United States).
121. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a); see also 1990 advisory committee note (explaining
rule); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1268 n.15 (5th Mr. 1979) (federal
prosecutor "may wish to draw to the attention of the Congress that, apparently, it
has never given authority to any magistrate to Issue warrants outside the confines
of a judicial district"). The Military Rules of Evidence, in contrast, provide
guidance for searches of military personnel and property, as well as nonmilitary
property, in foreign states. MIL. R. EVID. 315.
122. 494 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord Best v. United States,
184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir. 1950) ("Obviously, Congress may not nullify the

guarantees of the Fourth Amendment by the simple expedient of not empowering
anyjudicial officer to act on an application for a warrant"), cert dented, 340 U.S.
939 (1951). See also United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 168 n.14
(1977) (recognizing, in a different context, the court's "inherent power... to Issue
search warrants under circumstances conforming to the Fourth Amendment.");
Wedgwood, supra note 53, at 749 n. 10.
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The fact that these objections are unpersuasive, however,
should not be taken to minimize the very real hardships that
would be involved in obtaining warrants for foreign searches. To
obtain a warrant, law enforcement officers must prepare, and
present to a magistrate, sworn affidavits articulating specific facts
sufficient to constitute probable cause for a search.12 3 While this

requirement has been routinely incorporated Into the cost of law

enforcement in the United States, 12 4 such a requirement could
prove burdensome in a volatile foreign setting, where United
States agents would face language, communication, and
informational barriers. In addition, United States agents would
lack the support networks on which they can rely in the United
States, and would have to work instead with local police who
would most likely lack familiarity with United States probable
cause standards.1 2 5 A warrant requirement would be particularly
cumbersome in joint operations led by local police, especially in
operations initiated by foreign authorities and joined at a
subsequent stage by United States agents.
The combination of these circumstances lends support to the
Verdugo Court's holding that the warrant requirement be waived
for foreign-state searches; this conclusion may be considered
essentially a categorical addition to the "exigent circumstances"
exception, under which police may conduct warrantless searches
in circumstances when procurement of a warrant might put them
at risk or cause the loss of evidence. 12 6 On the other hand, the

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Verdugo, the Judicial Conference of
the United States proposed an addition to Rule 41 that would have granted
federal magistrates authority to issue warrants for searches of property outside
the United States. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a), 1990 advisory committee note
(discussing proposed Rule 41(a](3)). The Supreme Court, however, did not adopt
the amendment, concluding that it required further consideration. Id.
123. See generally 3 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 662, 670 (1982 & 1993 Supp.) [hereinafter WRIGHT &
MILLER].

124.

See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222

(1981) ("the

inconvenience incurred by the police [in obtaining a warrant] is generally
insignificant"). But see Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 433-39 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that even within the United States differences
among localities make strict application of the warrant requirement Impractical in
many areas where "the nearest magistrate may be 25 or even 50 miles away").
125. Rehnquist and Kennedy make this point United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. at 274; d. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Judge Wallace
also addressed the issue in his Ninth Circuit Verdugo dissent. 856 F.2d 1214,
1248-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979). Justice
Brennan noted that exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as for exigent
circumstances, "likely would be applicable more frequently abroad." 494 U.S. at
286 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, he would not have waived the warrant
requirement for law enforcement operations such as that against Verdugo, but
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Supreme Court's holding entails substantial costs127 and may not
be supported by the experience of United States agencies
abroad. 128
Given the flexibility conferred by the telephone
warrant procedure (which the Court did not examine), as well as
the also-unexamined possibility that some flexible variant of the
warrant requirement could be devised for foreign-state
searches,1 29 the appropriateness of the Court's blanket dismissal
of extraterritorial warrants may be open to dispute.
ii.

Imposing Domestic Standards Abroad

The burdens inherent in obtaining warrants abroad, however,
represent just one aspect of what is problematic about Justice
Brennan's approach.
The more fundamental problem with
Justice Brennan's approach, as with the Chief Justice's, is its
inherently categorical, wholesale nature. While Chief Justice
Rehnquist would confine the Fourth Amendment strictly within
United States borders and to United States citizens abroad,
Justice Brennan would transplant it in its entirety whenever
United States law enforcement operates overseas-imposing not
only its warrant requirement but also the host of per se rules that
govern domestic searches and seizures. While the principle of
would have confined the exception instead to *non-law-enforcement activities...
Implicating national security." Id.
For the suggestion that warrants be waived generally for foreign-state
searches under the exigent circumstances exception, see Harvard Note, supra
note 15, at 1690. Warrantless surveillance clearly may be constitutional when
conducted pursuant to the President's national security power, In particular when
it involves surveillance of foreign powers. See United States v. United States Dist.
Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 322 n.20 (1972).
127. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("Any assumption
that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to
issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes
secure only in the discretion of police officers ....
When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent."); see also
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 409-39 (1974) (comprehensive defense of warrant requirement and
exclusionary rule); Carol S. Stelker, Second Thoughts About First Prlnciples, 107
HARv. L. REv. 820, 852-56 (1994) (warrant requirement ensures that fact-finding
on probable cause is done prior to search, thus preventing police perjury and
hindsight evaluation, and ensuring the "triumph of rules over standards");
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and FourthAmendment Remedles, 77 VA. L. REV. 881
(1991).
128. As Justice Brennan noted, the United States Army requires
extraterritorial warrants for certain military searches. Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 286
n. 14. Army regulations require the Army to seek a warrant from a United States
court whenever the Army seeks to intercept certain nonmilitary wire or oral
communications outside United States territory. ARMY REGULAION 190-53 22(b) (1986).
129. See infra note 243.
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mutuality driving the extension of the Fourth Amendment abroad
may be sound, the consequences of a wholesale application of this
principle in the Fourth Amendment context are highly
troublesome.
Chief Justice Rehnquist identified one troubling aspect of
Brennan's approach-the concerns discussed above about
impeding United States sovereignty abroad, which implicate a
host of related concerns regarding national security and
separation of powers.1 3 0 Another concern, however, not directly
articulated in the Verdugo decision or examined in the academic
commentary, provides the chief basis of this Article's critique of
Justice Brennan's approach and the foundation for the responses
suggested in Part IV-a concern for the transnational context of
extraterritorial searches and seizures.
Extraterritorial law enforcement operations are, with very few
exceptions, joint operations conducted in conjunction with, and
generally under the direction of, local police.13 ' Because these
operations are conducted jointly by the police of two separate
jurisdictions, they are necessarily conducted under the guidance
of two distinct legal frameworks: United States law governing the
United States police, and local law governing the local police.
Thus, there are both two sets of actors and two sets of laws.
The Verdugo case illustrates the transnational aspects
inherent in such enforcement operations. DEA agents did not
attempt to search Verdugo's homes by themselves. Instead, in
accordance with DEA internal procedures,13 2 the agents sought
authorization from a top official of the Mexican Federal Judicial
Police (MFJP) in Mexico City.' 3 3 The agents then conducted the
searches in conjunction with a team of MFJP officers. Mexican

officers actually conducted the entries and searches, but in doing
so, followed oral instructions from the DEA agent n charge. Both
Mexican and United States officers removed evidence from the

premises.'

130. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273-75; United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1248-49 (Wallace, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist's concerns are discussed supra text accompanying notes 4045; the issue is explored more fully Infra, In part V.C.
131. Judge Wallace made this point in his Ninth Circuit Verdugo dissent, 856
F.2d at 1242, 1248.
For a fuller examination of the transnational law
enforcement context, see bnfra part III.B.
132. See DEA AGENTS MANUAL subch. 652, at 192 (1988) (requiring DEA
agents to obtain prior approval for investigations and searches in Mexico from the
top officials of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, and to conduct the searches in
cooperation with the MFJP), ctted In Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at
028 n.29.
133. See spranotes 20-22 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Not only was the search in Verdugo conducted jointly by two
separate police forces, but these police forces were bound, as
noted above, by two separate sets of search-and-seizure laws.
This aspect of extraterritorial searches highlights problems
inherent in Justice Brennan's approach that are distinct from the
previously noted concern with national sovereignty-problems
having less to do with burdens imposed on United States police
than with burdens imposed on foreign police and with the rights
of foreign suspects vis-h-vis their own governments.
These
concerns seem to have played little or no role in Justice
Brennan's analysis, and little or no role in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's critique of Justice Brennan's reasoning. Instead,
with the limited exception of Justice Kennedy's opinion, the
Supreme Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment's reach
appears to have taken place essentially in a vacuum, focusing
entirely on the relationship between the United States and the
individuals against whom it takes action and applying domestic
search-and-seizure standards to this relationship, with little
consideration for other relevant participants or legal systems.
C. All or Nothing?. The Needfor an Alternative Approach
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan took
sweeping, whole-cloth approaches to the application of Fourth
Amendment protections abroad. Both approaches are rooted in

broad theories of constitutional interpretation that seemingly
exist in a vacuum, disengaged from the transnational context in
which they must be applied. For both Justices, the Fourth
Amendment is either transplanted in its entirety or denied in its
entirety, and local laws and local law enforcement play no role in
their jurisprudential considerations. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
absolutist approach, drawing bright lines based on notions of
membership, poses a threat not only to the reach of constitutional
protections abroad, but also to the constitutional rights of aliens
within the United States. Justice Brennan, on the other hand,
would impose United States search-and-seizure law in its
entirety, including its warrant requirement and the full panoply of
its detailed, per se rules, whenever United States law enforcement
agents operate overseas. Whereas Chief Justice Rehnquist would
create a "law-free zone" for extraterritorial searches and seizures,
Justice Brennan would unilaterally impose United States law on
the world. These approaches leave the Court with unpalatable
choices: either the Fourth Amendment applies in its totality, or it
does not apply at all. Neither approach is likely to serve as a
promising model if and when the issue resurfaces before the
Supreme Court.
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III. BEYOND VERDUGO: "REASONABLE SEARCHFS" ABROAD
As noted previously, the Chief Justice's "Opinion of the
Court" in Verdugo was adopted in its entirety by only four
Justices.1 3 5 Thus, only four Justices stood behind the broad

proposition that Chief Justice Rehnquist advanced: that the
Fourth Amendment terminates at the water's edge for all except
United States citizens and resident aliens. Seven Justices (all
except Brennan and Marshall) supported the far more limited
proposition that the Amendment's warrant clause is inapplicable
to searches of noncitizens abroad. Left unresolved was the extraterritorial applicability and significance of the Amendment's
first clause, guaranteeing "the right of the people to be secure ...
against unreasonable searches and'seizures."l3 6
The Supreme Court has not returned to this question in the
four years since Verdugo, and the lower federal courts have
ignored the issue, assuming instead that the plurality's purported
holding spoke for a majority of the Court.1 3 7 Nevertheless, the
issue is bound to arise. Although foreign nationals like Verdugo
may no longer claim that a warrant was required for a search of
their homes, they may still seek to exclude evidence on the
135. See supra part HA.

136. Numerous commentators have made this point. See supra note 53.
137. Although numerous commentators have addressed the limited scope of
the Verdugo holding, see supra note 53, every federal court that has referred to
Verdugo's "holding" has simply assumed, without analysis, that the holding was
that proclaimed by Chief Justice Rehnquist: that is, the Fourth Amendment Is
inapplicable in its entirety to searches of nonresident aliens in a foreign state.
See United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1157 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993) ("We note
that neither probable cause nor a search warrant was required to search [a hotel
room in Juarez, Mexico]. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches or
seizures conducted on foreign soil, even if the search involves agents of the
United States government."); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 834 (2d Cir. 1991)
("the Court [in Verdugol held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a
search and seizure by United States officials of property that is owned by a
nonresident alien and located in a foreign country"); United States v. Aikins, 946
F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Inlgo, 925 F.2d 641, 656
(3d Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 250-51 (9th Cir.
1990) (Fourth Amendment does not apply to nonresident aliens in international
waters); United States v. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Colo. 1992) (same
regarding searches in foreign state); United States v. Norlega, 746 F. Supp. 1506,
1532 n.28 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (same); Narisma v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 548,
551 n.8 (D.D.C. 1990) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 928 F.2d 1154 (D.C. Cir.
1991); see also United States v. Tehrani, 826 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D. Vt. 1993)
(determining what constitutes "substantial connection" with United States
sufficient to trigger Fourth Amendment rights for alien attempting to challenge
extraterritorial search of his property); United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774,
782 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (concluding that, since Verdugo does not apply to searches
of United States citizens in foreign states, United States citizens and resident
aliens are entitled to same Fourth Amendment protections abroad as they enjoy
within United States).
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ground that the search was "unreasonable," whether because it
was undertaken without probable cause or because it was
executed unreasonably.
Such a challenge would give the
Supreme Court the opportunity to confront the question left open
in Verdugo: Should the "unreasonable searches" clause of the
Fourth Amendment govern extraterritorial searches of foreign
nationals? If the Justices decide that the answer to this question
is yes, they then will have to answer the next question: What Is
an "unreasonable search" outside United States territory?l 88
Applying the Unreasonable Searches Clause abroad, of
course, would not be consistent with the reasoning of the Verdugo
plurality. However, it would be consistent with, although not
compelled by, the positions taken by the other five Justices in
Verdugo,1 3 9 pre-Verdugo Supreme Court authority, 140 numerous
opinions by the federal courts of appeals prior to Verdugo, 14 1 and
the overwhelming weight of commentary on the Verdugo
decision.142

138. This issue was left essentially untouched by the five opinions In
Verdugo. The most significant opinions-those by Justices Rehnquist, Brennan,
and Kennedy-did not stray near the question of "reasonableness" abroad.
Rehnqust dismissed the Fourth Amendment in toto; Brennan adopted the entire
Amendment; and Kennedy addressed only the Warrant Clause. The two Justices
who touched briefly on the "reasonableness" requirement, Stevens and
Blackmun, both did so summarily, with no inquiry into the niceties of Its meaning

overseas.

Justice Stevens assumed that reasonableness vas required, but

concluded (on grounds that his opinion does not make explicit) that the search
"was not 'unreasonable' as that term is used in the first clause of the
Amendment." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279. Justice
Blackmun summarily concluded that the reasonableness requirement applies
abroad and that it consists of a probable cause requirement. Id. at 297-98.
139. Applying the "reasonableness" requirement would be consistent with the
opinions of Justice Brennan (who, with Justice Marshall, would have applied the
entire Amendment), Justices Blackmun and Stevens (who both specifically
concluded that "reasonableness" applied), and Justice Kennedy (who did not
address the "reasonableness" requirement but did not rule It out either, and
whose *due process" approach is supportive of a "reasonableness" analysis).
140. E.g., Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
141. E.g., United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cr. 1979); United
States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 259 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979); United States v.
Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d
975, 989 n.45 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974); see also cases cited Infra note 195
(assuming Fourth Amendment applies to searches of aliens abroad under "Joint
venture" rule).
142. See articles and student commentary cited supra note 67 (criticizing a
"water's edge" rule for the Fourth Amendment). For commentary specifically
advocating a "reasonableness" standard abroad, see Wedgwood, supra note 53;
Harvard Note, supra note 15. For a recent article arguing that reasonableness,
not warrants or probable cause, should be understood as the Amendment's
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A. Picking Up Where Kennedy Left Off: "ReasonableSearches"

As to how the Court might construe the meaning of
unreasonable searches in the context of actions taken abroad,
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Verdugo suggests a promising
approach, albeit one that Justice Kennedy himself did not pursue
beyond the warrant context. 14 3 In his opposition to "rigid and
abstract rule[s]" and in his insistence on tailoring the
Constitution's strictures to "the particular circumstances of a
particular case,"144
Justice Kennedy demonstrated greater
responsiveness to the peculiar problems and nuances of the
case's transnational context than did the other members of the
Court. Doing what Justice Kennedy declined to do in Verdugo,
that is, applying his analytical framework to the broader question
of the meaning of "reasonableness" abroad, is one option available
to the Court.
Thus, the Supreme Court could give flesh to the concept of
reasonableness by asking (to quote Justice Kennedy): "What
process is 'due' a defendant in the particular circumstances of a
particular case?"14 5

By adopting this balancing approach to the

central concern, see Akhul R. Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARv.
L. REV. 757 (1994).
A recent article by Lea Brilmayer, which attempts a theoretical reconception of
the international practice of United States courts, also offers Indirect support for
viewing Fourth Amendment protections transnationally. See Brilmayer, supra
note 59. Distinguishing between "horizontal" cases (between competing sovereigns) and "vertical" cases (between states and individuals), Brilmayer argues that
transnational relationships between one state and the citizens of another state
("diagonal" relationships) "implicate questions of state/individual legitimacy" in
the same way as traditional "vertical" cases between a state and its citizens:
There are limits on what states may properly do to individuals, whether
the individuals are citizens or noncitizens ....
The point of a vertical
analysis of international law is that state/individual relationships raise
issues of the legitimacy of coercion even when they cross jurisdictional
lines. The mere fact that diagonal relations cross state borders does not
mean that they are automatically exempt from the norms of political
propriety that would apply to purely vertical relationships.
Id. at 2296-97.
143. Justice Kennedy, as noted above, supra text accompanying note 51, did
not examine what restrictions reasonableness would impose on searches abroad,
but instead confined his analysis to the applicability of the Warrant Clause in
Mexico, despite the parties' briefing of the reasonableness issue. See Brief for the
United States, supra note 3, at *23-24; Brief for Respondent Verdugo, supra note
3, at '22-24.
144. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (quoting Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1. 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
145. Id.
This approach belongs to the third tradition of constitutional
interpretation, previously mentioned only in passing, which was advanced by
Justice Harlan in the Reid v. Covert concurrence and from which Justice Kennedy
borrowed liberally in his Verdugo concurrence. Professor Neuman has dubbed
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meaning of "reasonable searches" abroad, the Court could apply
the Amendment in a simplified manner, dispensing with some or
all of the per se rules that characterize domestic Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The Department of Justice suggested
such an approach as its fallback position in Verdugo, in the event
that the Court did not agree that the entire Amendment was
inapplicable, 48 and the approach has drawn some scholarly
support.' 47 This approach would be responsive to the concerns of
Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy regarding the risks of law
enforcement abroad and the danger and inappropriateness of
tying the hands of the executive branch when it takes action
outside United States borders.
This approach would rely on the inherently flexible nature of
the Fourth Amendment, rooted in the Amendment's text, which
imposes no restrictions beyond reasonableness and certain
standards for obtaining a warrant.14 8 As the Supreme Court has
noted, "the Fourth Amendment commands that searches and
seizures be reasonable. What is reasonable depends upon all of
the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the
Ordinarily, the
nature of the search or seizure itself."' 49
Amendment requires probable cause and a warrant, but
exceptions to these requirements are permitted "when special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 150
this approach the "global due process" tradition. Neuman, supra note 12, at 91920, 987-90. This Article suggests use of Justice Kennedy's approach only as the
second part of a two-part analysis. That is, the Article accepts Justice Brennan's
fundamental contention that constitutional protections extend as far as the
Justice Kennedy's balancing
obligations imposed by United States laws.
approach, however, comes Into play in determining the extent of the rights that
are granted.
146. See Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at *23-28 ("agents
conducting Investigations overseas should at most be bound by the more flexible
Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness").
147. See Wedgwood, supra note 53, at 754 (advocating "rule of reason,"
requiring extraterritorial search to be "reasonable,' to be evaluated upon a totality
of the circumstances, with none of the per se rules of domestic Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, and with evidence to be excluded only where conduct
is grossly unreasonable"); Harvard Note, supra note 15.
148. See Amar, supra note 142, at 761-85 (concluding that warrant and
probable cause requirements cannot be traced to text of the Fourth Amendment).
149. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); see
also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) ("what is reasonable depends
on the context within which a search takes place"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968) ("the specific content and Incidents of [the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures] must be shaped by the context in which it is
asserted").

150. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
Thus, the "exigent circumstances" exception allows police to conduct warrantless
searches In situations when the procurement of a warrant might put them at risk
or cause the loss of potential evidence. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-
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A flexible approach of this sort, responding to the "special
needs" of United States agents conducting extraterritorial
searches, would be more realistic than Justice Brennan's
requirement that Fourth Amendment standards be exported
wholesale wherever United States agents may be found. At the
same time, it would provide suspects like Verdugo with at least a
ninimum of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
This approach, however, addresses only one of the concerns
While it
articulated above, the concern about inflexibility.
provides a promising alternative to the categorical, whole-cloth
approaches of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, it does not
address concerns about the transnational character of searches
in foreign states--concerns either about the joint nature of these
searches or about the diversity of laws, cultures, and political
systems that they implicate.
B. The TransnationalLaw Enforcement Context
As the Justice Department noted in its brief to the Supreme
Court in Verdugo, searches and seizures in foreign states are of
necessity a cooperative endeavor, with United States agents
routinely cast in the supporting role. 1 5 ' In the "typical case," of
which Verdugo provides an example, "the foreign officials are the

ones who decide the scope of and reasonableness of any proposed
search," and United States agents "must comply with the
demands of their hosts."152 The reasons for this are both legal
and practical.
60 (1979). Additionally, warrantless searches may be conducted of automobiles,

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); incident to arrest, United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); or under circumstances "where it was concluded
that the public interest required some flexibility in the application of the general
rule that a valid warrant is a prerequisite for a search." Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759.
Probable cause may also be dispensed with under appropriate circumstances--e.g., for "stop-and-frisks," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); administrative inspections, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); searches
in public schools, New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); border
searches, United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-41 (1985);
searches at sea, United States v. Arra 630 F.2d 836 (Ist Cir. 1980); and searches
in a host of other circumstances involving enhanced security concerns. See
generally LAFAVE, supra note 53, §§ 4.1(a), 6.5, 9.1, 10.1-11.
151. Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at *25-28. The Justice
Department's posture in the Verdugo case, of course, contrasts sharply with its
stance in United States v. Alvarez-Machai, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992), where it
argued that the United States reserves the right to "snatch" criminal suspects
unilaterally in a foreign state. See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
152. Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at *26-27. Judge Wallace also
made this point in dissent to the Ninth Circuit's Verdugo opinion. 856 F.2d 1214,
1249 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting); and see infra notes 161-75 and
accompanying text.

366

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
It is

a

settled principle

of international

[Vol. 27:329

law that law

enforcement operations are exclusively entrusted to each state
within its own jurisdiction, and that when one state sends police
to another state to conduct a search, it may conduct the search
only with the permission, and conforming to the laws, of the host
state.15 3 The force of this principle may be obscured by a few
recent, highly publicized examples of unilateral United States law
enforcement abroad, notably the much-celebrated United States
invasion of Panama in order to capture Panamanian strongman
Manuel Noriega' 5 4 and the abduction from Mexico of Dr.
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, wanted as an accessory to the torture
and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena.15 5
The uproar
that these episodes produced, however, only serves to underscore
their extraordinary nature.15 These two cases do not throw into

153. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2201-02, 2206
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) fit is a breach of international law to "perform acts
of sovereignty in the territory of another state," Including sending agents into
another state to apprehend criminal suspects]; Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 556-57 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part) ("Under the classic view of territorial sovereignty, each state
has a monopoly on the exercise of governmental power within its borders and no
state may perform an act in the territory of a foreign state without consent"); The
Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371 (1824) (United States entry into foreign port
for purpose of seizing foreign vessel which violated United States laws is "clear
violation of the laws of nations"); The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812) (jurisdiction of state within its own territory is
.necessarily exclusive and absolute ...
One sovereign . . . can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or .. . by implication");
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66-68 (2d Cir.), cerL denied,
421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (abduction of defendant from another state violates
international law if the offended state objects); United States v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1974) (abduction of person in foreign territory violates
that state's sovereignty and is redressable by the return of the defendant); S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7) ("the first and
foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that... it may
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State"); Opinion of
the Inter-American Juridical Committee on Alvarez-Machain, O.A.S. CJI/Res. II15/92, Aug. 15, 1992, reprinted In 13 Hum. Rts. L.J., No. 9-10, at 395 (1992);
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§ 432-33 (United States
authorities may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with
the other state's consent); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 162 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963]; IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 280, 284 (2d ed. 1973); Jordan
J. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice, and
Unaddressed Human Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 551, 568 n.65 (1993)
(listing additional authorities).
154. See United States v. Norlega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
Symposium, The PanamanianRevolution (pts. 1 & 2), 84 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc.
182, 236 (1990).
155. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
156. The Noriega and Alvarez-Machain episodes constituted unusually
aggressive examples of what is known as "Irregular rendition"-the seizure of
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doubt the general principle of territorial sovereignty;1 57 they
demonstrate merely that the principle is subject to occasional
exceptions.' 5 8 While the Justice Department reserves the right to
conduct unilateral operations abroad on exceptional occasions,159
it has nonetheless embraced, in the internal guidelines it
promulgates for United States law enforcement agencies, the rule
of territorial sovereignty as the guiding principle for law
enforcement operations in foreign states.160
fugitives from abroad by means other than those provided for in extradition
treaties. See generally NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3, at 43657. Despite their "irregular" nature, most irregular renditions are cooperative
efforts between United States and local police. Id. at 442-43. The Noriega and
Alvarez operations reflect the more aggressive, and more unilateral, approach to

International rendition adopted by the United States in the late 1980s, driven by
concerns over International terrorism and drug trafficking. See id. at 445-57; and
see infra note 159. The heavy dose of international goodwill that these two
operations expended provides one reason why such actions are likely to remain
extremely rare occurrences. See Bush, supra note 9, at 968-71.
157. While Justice Stevens denounced extraterritorial abduction as
"monstrous" in his Alvarez dissent, 112 S. Ct. at 2201, 2206, the Alvarez majority
did not contest the illegality of the practice. See 112 S. Ct. at 2196 ("Respondent
and his amic may be correct that respondent's abduction... may be in violation
of general international law principles"). The majority confined itself instead to
construing the terms of the U.S.-Mexican extradition treaty.
As for the Noriega operation, the district court likewise declined to address the
underlying legality of the General's capture; instead, it concluded that Noriega, as
an unrecognized head of state, lacked standing to challenge the invasion as a
violation of international law in the absence of a protest from Panama's legitimate
government. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533-35 (S.D. Fla.
1990).
158. The Supreme Court did not explore these exceptions in Alvarez since it
confined itself to construing the United States-Mexico extradition treaty, but
commentators have addressed the issue in response. See Bush, supra note 9, at
977-82; Paust, supra note 153, at 563-67. Possible exceptions include: an
"Eichmann exception" allowing for unilateral response to "crimes against
humanity;" a "self defense" exception, allowing unilateral action when necessary
against, for example, international terrorism; a "humanitarian intervention"
exception, allowing states to respond with force to violations of the U.N. Charter;
and an exception (invoked by defenders of the United States action against
Alvarez-Machain) for situations of overriding national interest. Bush, supra, at
977-82; Paust, supra, at 563-67.
159. The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) concluded in an
opinion issued in 1989, the year before the abduction of Alvarez-Machain, that
the President has inherent constitutional authority to order the FBI to carry out
investigations and arrests in foreign states even if those actions violate
international law. See Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
Override Customary or Other International Law in the Course of Extraterritorial
Law Enforcement Activities, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 195 (1989), 1989 OLC
LEXIS 19 [hereinafter OLC Opinion]. The 1989 opinion, which was not released
to the public until 1993, reversed a 1980 OLC opinion on the same topic,
Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4B Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 543 (1980).
160. For example, internal DPA guidelines (which are not made available to
the public) provide that in general "DEA representatives will not engage or
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It is not only international law, but practical realities as well,
that prevent the United States from conducting unilateral law
-enforcement operations in foreign states.16 1 United States law
enforcement agents operating in a foreign state must try to
accomplish their objectives while stripped of most of the powers of
search and arrest that they wield in the United States.16 2 To
accomplish anything, they generally must engage the cooperation
of local authorities at one level or another.1 6 3 In attempting to do
so, they face additional hurdles, in the form of alien legal and
political systems, divergent law enforcement cultures, and
diplomatic frictions. 164
As a result, United States extraterritorial law enforcement
now takes place within an elaborate framework of international
cooperation, at all levels of formality. At the informal level, United
States law enforcement agents go to great lengths to establish and

participate in unilateral investigative operations or other activities outside the
scope of the formal or informal agreement developed between the United States
and the host government unless these activities have the express and explicit
approval of a responsible host government official." DEA Agents Manual, subch.
651, at 181 (1988), quoted in Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at "26
n.25. For investigations or searches in Mexico, prior approval must come from
top officials of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, and searches must then be
conducted in cooperation with the MFJP. See supra note 132.
See also United States Attorneys' Manual, §§ 9-13.500 et seq. (1988) (setting
guidelines for obtaining evidence abroad, generally through methods that respect
host state's sovereignty, such as letters rogatory, requests pursuant to treaties or
executive agreements, or informal requests; only in exceptional circumstances by
unilateral action such as subpoena).
161. For overviews of United States extraterritorial law enforcement, see
MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: CRIMINAL
(3 vols.) (1990); INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1986); NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3; Martin, supra note 3;
Nadelmann, Int'l Enforcement supra note 3.
162. See NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3, at 4-10, 200.
163. See Nadelmann, Int'l Enforcement, supra note 3, at 46-57 (describing
extraterritorial activities of the DEA, FBI, Customs Service, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Secret Service, Postal Inspection Service, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, IRS, United States Marshals Service, state and
local agencies, and the criminal investigative branches of the United States
military). The DEA, for instance, which maintains by far the largest international
presence among United States civilian law enforcement agencies (about two
hundred fifty agents stationed in forty-four foreign states), devotes only a small
fraction of its resources to unilateral activities. See ki. at 48-50. DEA agents
stationed abroad act as liaisons with local police, providing intelligence on
international drug trafficking, promoting broader cooperation and the pursuance
of United States anti-narcotics objectives, and lobbying for changes in local laws
to facilitate United States goals; unilateral law enforcement activities are generally
confined to surveillance and recruitment of informants. DEA agents may also
accompany local police in joint drug enforcement operations, although even this
activity was denied them by Congress until recently. Id.
164. NADELMANN, CoPSACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3, at 4-10 & passim.
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maintain productive working relationships with local police;1 65
this frequently takes the form, especially where local police are
underfunded or corrupt, of providing funding and training for elite
drug enforcement units composed of local police. 16 At the more
formal level, efforts to obtain information, locate persons, serve
documents, execute investigative requests, and conduct joint and
individual investigations are coordinated through Interpol, the
international police agency. 16 7 Assistance is provided at the
prosecutorial and judicial level as well, as United States law
enforcement agents must rely on local courts to issue search
warrants, to immobilize targeted assets, to compel witnesses to
testify or produce documents, and to extradite criminal
defendants. 16 8

Increasingly, transnational cooperation has been formalized
through mutual legal assistance treaties between the United
States and its allies. 16 9 Mutual assistance between the United
States and Mexico is now governed by such a treaty,17o although
it was signed and ratified only after the Verdugo incident.171
Under the United States-Mexico treaty, which parallels the
majority of the United States other mutual-assistance treaties in
most significant respects,' 7 2 both state parties are obligated to
"takie] all appropriate measures that they have legal authority to
take" to provide mutual assistance to the other in criminal
matters, including executing requests for searches and
seizures.' 7 3 The treaty requires that searches and seizures be
carried out by the "requested party" (the host state) "in

165. See 1d. at 190-91, 199-207, 288-90.
166. See id. at 291-97.
167. See 3 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 161, §§ 12-1-2, 12-3-1; NADELMANN,

CoPs AcRoss BORDERS, supra note 3, at 181-86.
168. See 3 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 161, § 12-1-3; NADELMANN, COPS
ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3, at 313-24, 397-436.
169. See 3 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 161, §§ 12-4-1 to 12-4-8; NADELMANN,
CoPs ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3, at 324-84. Since the entry into force of the
first mutual-assistance treaty in 1977-with Switzerland-the United States as of
1992 had signed similar treaties with seventeen other states: Argentina, the

Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, the
Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom
(Cayman Islands), and Uruguay. NADELMANN, supra, app. E.
170. Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex.,
entered into force May 3, 1991, 27 I.L.M. 447 (1988) [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico
Assistance Treaty].
171. The searches of Verdugo's residences took place on January 25-26,
1986. Verdugo (S.D. Cal.), supra note 20. (The Ninth Circuit erroneously
reported the date as January 25, 1988. 856 F.2d at 1216).
172. See NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3, at 378-79.
173. U.S.-Mexico Assistance Treaty, supra note 170, art 1.
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accordance with its constitutional and other legal provisions."1 74
Additionally, it provides that nothing in the treaty "empower[s]
one Party's authorities to undertake, in the territorial jurisdiction

of the other, the exercise and performance of the functions or
authority exclusively entrusted to the authorities of that other
Party by its national laws or regulations."17 5
Thus, whether under formal or informal arrangements, and
whether governed by customary international law or treaty law,
United States agents almost always play a supporting or advisory
role to local police. Against this backdrop, a unilateral imposition
of United States search-and-seizure law such as Justice Brennan
envisioned appears entirely inappropriate--although no less
inappropriate than Chief Justice Rehnquist's unilateral abdication
of responsibility for the targets of such operations.176
The
challenge is to formulate an alternative approach that balances a
concern for the transnational context of overseas searches and
the legitimate interests of United, States extraterritorial law
enforcement with a concern that defendants in such operations
not find themselves entirely outside the realm of law. That is the
purpose of Parts IV and V of this Article.

IV. TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL FouRTH AMENDMENT
To respond to the concerns articulated above, a transnational
approach to "reasonable searches" abroad could take one of two
basic directions-it could look to local law to inform its conception
of what searches are "reasonable" In any given foreign state, or It
could look to international norms to create a more uniform
standard.177
The two sections in this Part explore these
174. Id. art. 1(4)(e). Note, however, that, like most of the United States other
mutual assistance treaties, the Mexico treaty expressly precludes any private
right of action based on the treaty. Id. art. 1(5).
175. Id. art. 1(2).
176. The Chief Justice's approach, as noted above, Is consistent with the
approach the Supreme Court has adopted toward international affairs in several
Important opinions in recent years. See cases cited supra note 5.
177. While the focus of this Article is on Judicial implementation of these
approaches, either approach could, even more appropriately, be implemented by
statute. This would accord with Chief Justice Rehnquist's suggestion in Verdugo
that, in light of concerns about restricting United States freedom of action abroad,
restrictions on law enforcement abroad would be best left to Congress and the
President. 494 U.S. at 275. It would also accord with the suggestions of
commentators in this regard. See Harold H. Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil
Wrongs: Combatting TerrorismThrough TransnationalPublicLaw Litigation, 22 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 169, 189-93 (1987) (Congress is branch best suited to creating remedies
for extraterritorial wrongs; in absence of congressional action, courts may create
second-best solution); Paust, supra note 153, at 574-77 (recommending
legislation prohibiting extraterritorial abduction in wake of Supreme Court's
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alternatives. Section A explores the "local law," or "binational,"
approach, which incorporates elements of the search-and-seizure
law of the host state into the definition of reasonableness. This
approach runs strongly against the grain of United States
practice, but it nevertheless responds effectively to many of the

concerns expressed above. Section B explores the "international"
approach: the adoption of a minimum international benchmark
for transnational searches and seizures, fashioned out of
international human rights norms and the search-and-seizure
practices of the world's major legal systems.178

A. The Choice-of-Law Approach: A BinatlonalStandard
A binational approach, incorporating the search-and-seizure
standards of the search jurisdiction into the definition of a
"reasonable search" abroad, would be a natural response to the
joint nature of transnational law enforcement. Because searches
abroad implicate the laws of the host state and since, almost
without exception, they involve the police of both the prosecuting
and host states, one would expect the law of the search
jurisdiction to be an essential element in any determination of the
reasonableness of a transnational search. This section will
propose such an approach-specifcally, that evidence seized in a
joint search abroad be excluded only if it violates the search-andseizure laws of both the United States and the state in which the
search is conducted.

failure to enforce international law prohibition of same in Alvarez-Machafn). This
legislation could incorporate international law by reference. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988); 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821 (1988).
178. Under neither approach does this Article's analysis depend on the
citizenship of the individuals searched. Thus, it is recommended that the courts
apply the binational or international standard equally to citizens and noncitizens
alike.
This nationality-blind approach, of course, would be counter to the
reasoning of the Verdugo plurality, to Justice Brennan's dissent, and to some
cases in the lower courts that have assumed that the Fourth Amendment's full

domestic proscriptions apply abroad. But, as with this Article's recommendations
in general, it would not be barred by Supreme Court precedent. See Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that Constitution protects citizens abroad, but
not addressing specifics of citizens' extraterritorial Fourth Amendment rights); cf.
Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 283 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that plurality does
not "questioni I the validity of the rule, accepted by every Court of Appeals to have
considered the question," that full Fourth Amendment protections apply to
searches of United States citizens abroad).
An exception would have to be made for military personnel and their relatives,
as well as any individuals who are abroad in an official capacity or who are
otherwise in an agency relationship to the United States government that would
make them deserving of full domestic protections.
See MIL. R. EvnD. 311
(extending full Fourth Amendment protections to military personnel regardless of
location).

372

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:329

This approach would be a departure for United States courts,
which previously have not consulted foreign law in determining
the legality of searches abroad. Almost uniformly, United States
courts have proceeded on the assumption, as Justice Brennan did
in Verdugo, 179 that United States law applies in its totality
abroad, if any law does, and that the relationship of the search to
local law Is "irrelevant."1 8 0 The doctrine chiefly responsible for
this approach is known as the "international silver platter."
1. The "International Silver Platter"
Before Verdugo, United States courts faced with
extraterritorial searches "assumed," as the Ninth Circuit put it in
its Verdugo decision, "that the fourth amendment constrains the
manner in which the federal government may pursue its
extraterritorial law enforcement objectives."18 1 Courts were able
to proceed on this assumption without unduly constraining the
pursuit and prosecution of criminals beyond United States shores
because of a framework principle which, in its effect, ensured that
the Fourth Amendment essentially never applied. That principle
is that "fourth amendment principles do not apply to searches by
foreign authorities in their own countries."182 The consequence

179. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 294 ("1 see no reason to
distinguish between foreign and domestic searches").
180. See Verdugo, 856 F.2d 1214, 1229 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the
relevant standard is that imposed within the United States by the Fourth
Amendment, and that "whether [the search] may also have violated Mexican law
Is irrelevant"); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir.) ("The mere
consent of foreign authorities to a seizure that would be unconstitutional in the
United States does not dissipate its illegality even though the search would be
valid under local law."), cert dented, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v.
Cotronl, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1975) (ia]ppellants' rights vis-A-vis their own
government are not defined by the provisions of the United States Constitution
and are therefore 'no legal concern of an American court!"), cert. dented, 426 U.S.
906 (1976).
One court that has invoked foreign law Is the Court of Military Appeals. See
Infra notes 344-49. However, research for this Article turned up only a handful of
cases in which nonmilitary courts have looked to foreign search-and-selzure law
to inform their understanding of a search's legality. See United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp.
423 (M.D. Fla. 1979). Peterson is discussed Infra, note 205.
181. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988).
182. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987). The
principle has been articulated by the Supreme Court only in dicta in a footnote.
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976). Every federal court of
appeals that has addressed the issue has reached the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cr. 1985); United States v. Hensel,
699 F.2d 18, 25 (Ist Cir. 1983), cert dented, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); United States v.
Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1981), cert dented, 456 U.S. 991 (1982);
Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. dented, 442 U.S. 931 (1979);
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has been that United States courts, as did the Supreme Court in
Verdugo, have focused entirely on the conduct of United States
police, to the more or less complete exclusion of the conduct of
foreign police under whose guidance these searches almost
With foreign police relegated
always have been conducted.
essentially to the status of "private individuals," their
participation in extraterritorial searches has been ignored, along
with the relevance of the local laws binding these police.
a. "Private Searches:" The Burdeau Rule
The principle that the Fourth Amendment "does not apply to
searches by foreign authorities in their own countries" is derived
from the 70-year-old rule, first set out by the Supreme Court in
Burdeau v. McDowell, 183 that "private searches" are beyond the
scope of the Fourth Amendment.1 8 4 In Burdeau, the Supreme
Court held that, since the Fourth Amendment "was not intended
to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies,"
searches by private detectives or other "private" individuals were
beyond its scope;185 consequently, evidence obtained illegally by
private individuals and subsequently turned over to the
authorities need not be excluded from a criminal trial.
Debate about the Burdeau rule generally centers, not on the
validity of the rule, which is universally accepted,1 8 6 but on its
United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.

Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 269-71 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968), cert dented,
395 U.S. 960 (1969); Brdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782-83 (5th CIr.
See also FOREIGN RELATIONS
1965), cert. dented, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 433(3).
183. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
184. The link between Burdeau's "private searches" rule and the "foreign
searches" rule was noted by the Supreme Court on the one occasion on which it
articulated, albeit briefly, the "foreign searches" rule. United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976) ("It is well established, of course, that the exclusionary
rule... is not applicable where a private party or aforeign government commits
the offending act.") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Marzano, 537
F.2d 257, 269 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying Burdeau standard to foreign search).
185. 256 U.S. at 475.
186. The rule is still good law, despite significant change in much of Fourth
Amendment law since the time of Burdeau, and it has been applied to a broad
variety of circumstances. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 1.8(a). For example,
courts have admitted evidence obtained when a landlord searched his tenants
possessions, when a telephone company monitored calls, when an airline
employee searched an unclaimed bag, and when a burglar who discovered
evidence of his victim's criminality sent it to the police. See Id. § 1.8(a), at 177.
Arguments for the rule generally stress the various purposes that are served
when courts exclude evidence which has been wrongfully seized by government
officials, but which would not be served when the search was by a private
individual. See Id. § 1.8(a). First, exclusion is said to deter police misconduct.
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scope-precisely what it takes to put a search outside the
"private" category. Thus, for instance, a search is not private if it
has been ordered or requested by a government official, even if a
private individual carries it out.1 8 7 Many cases of private-official
cooperation, of course, fall into a gray area, where courts must
ascertain whether enough cooperation or understanding existed
between government officials and private individuals (including,
for instance, private security guards and private detectives) to
turn the "private" search into an "official" one. The courts deem
evidence excludable if the search was a "joint endeavor" between a
private person and a government'official.188 This is so whether or
not the government official "originated the idea or joined in it
while the search was in progress;" it is sufficient that the official
"was in it before the object of the search was completely
accomplished."1 8 9
The notion of "joint endeavors" is central to
the issues that arise when the Burdeau rule is applied to searches
by foreign officials.
b. From Private to Foreign Searches
The Burdeau rule has given rise to a number of variants,
collectively known as the "silver platter" doctrine, which allow
officials of one jurisdiction to receive evidence from an external
illegal source without also receiving the taint-as if the evidence
had been handed over "on a silver platter." 19o It is just a small

When evidence has been obtained by private individuals, on the other hand,
exclusion is unlikely to have a deterrent effect: first, the private searcher is likely
to be motivated by reasons other than a desire to secure criminal conviction;
second, he is not as likely to be a repeat player who will feel the sting of
exclusion. Exclusion, secondly, Is said to prevent government from "profiting
from its own wrongdoing." Obviously, when a search Is private, the wrongdoing

from which the government profits will not be its own (for whatever that

distinction is worth). And third, exclusion is said to serve the "imperative of
Judicial integrity" by preventing courts from becoming "accomplices" in official
wrongdoing. When the search is by a private individual, the courts of course do

not condone official wrongdoing (though they arguably compromise their integrity
by appearing perhaps to condone individualwrongdoing). Id.
187. Id. § 1.8(b), at 178.

188. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966). See also 1
LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 1.8(b), at 179.
189. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949). This case concerned the
state-to-federal silver platter, but the standard has been invoked by courts
applying Burdeau.
190. The phrase was coined in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949),
twelve years before the Court extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
to searches by state officials in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Lustig, the
Supreme Court concluded that evidence unconstitutionally seized by state
officers without federal participation could be introduced in a federal trial, since
"a search is . . . not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state
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step from the Burdeau rule immunizing "private" searches, and
the now-defunct state-to-federal silver platter immunizing state
searches, 19 1 to a rule extending the silver platter to officials of
foreign states.
Foreign police are, of course, not "private individuals," but for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment they are treated as if they
were. This "international silver platter"19 2 is activated when
foreign police conduct a search that, if it were conducted in the
United States, would not meet Fourth Amendment standards. If

the foreign police then hand over the fruits of the search to United
States authorities, and they are offered into evidence in a United
States court, United States courts agree that the evidence may be
93
admitted.,
The rationale for the international silver platter is expressed
in very few cases. On the rare occasions when courts have
attempted an explanation, they have focused on the purported
lack of deterrent effect that excluding such evidence would have.
As the Ninth Circuit opined in its Verdugo decision:
Because the fourth amendment does not itself require
exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, and because
excluding reliable evidence will not force foreign officers to
authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter." 338 U.S.
at 78-79.
The state-to-federal silver platter was eliminated in Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960), one year before Mapp made the issue moot. Other silver
platters still remain today-the "interstate silver platter" (which allows the courts
of one state to admit evidence seized in another state in violation of that state's
law), the "private (Burdeau)silver platter," and the "international silver platter."
See generally 1 LAFAVE, supra note 53, §§ 1.5(c) (interstate silver platter), 1.8(a)-(f)
(private silver platter), 1.8(g) (international silver platter).
191. See supra note 190.
192. This phrase is used, e.g., in 1 LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 1.8(g), and in
Note, The New International "SilverPlatter"Doctrine: Admissibility in FederalCourts
of Evidence Illegally Obtained by Foreign Officers In a Foreign Country, 2 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 280 (1969) [hereinafter Note, The New International "Silver Platter"
Doctrine].

193. See cases cited supra note 182.

For general discussions of the

International silver platter, see 1 LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 1.8(g); Keith Raffel,
Searches and Seizures Abroad in the Federal Courts, 38 MD. L. REV. 689 (1979);
Saltzburg, supra note 77; Harry S. Chandler, Note, Searches South of the Border
Admission of Evidence Seized by ForeignOfficials, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 886 (1968);
Steven M. Kaplan, Note, The Applicability of the ExclusionaryRule in Federal Court
to Evidence Seized and Confessions Obtained In Foreign Countries, 16 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 495 (1977); Robert L. King, Note, The InternationalSilver Platterand
the "Shocks the Conscience" Test. U.S. Law Enforcement Overseas, 67 WASH. U.
L.Q. 489 (1989); Charles E.M. Kolb, Note, The FourthAmendment Abroad: Civilian
and Military Perspectives, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 515 (1977); Steven H. Thelsen, Note,
Evidence Seized in Foreign Searches: When Does the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule Apply?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161 (1983); Note, The New
International"SilverPlatter"Doctrine,supra note 192.
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abide by the norms of the fourth amendment, the
exclusionary rule has no application to searches conducted
solely by a foreign government.' 9 4

Courts have carved out a limited exception to this rule, which

makes

the Fourth Amendment

and its exclusionary

rule

applicable to foreign-conducted searches "if Federal agents so
substantially participated in the raids so as to convert them into
joint ventures between the United States and foreign officials."'

This

exception,

known

as

the

"joint venture"

or

95

"joint

participation" exception,' 9 6 is the reason that Verdugo made it to
the Supreme Court. Had the district court not concluded that
DEA agents conducted a "joint venture" with the Mexican
police,1 9 7 Verdugo's motion to suppress would have been
summarily dismissed, and the broader Fourth Amendment
question would never have reached the High Court.
The exception, however, has been construed extremely
narrowly. The district and circuit court decisions in Verdugo were

194. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988).
See also United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("It is
obvious ... that since United States courts cannot be expected to police law
enforcement practices around the world, let alone to conform such practices to
Fourth Amendment standards by means of deterrence, the exclusionary rule does
not normally apply to foreign searches conducted by foreign officials"); Stonehill v.
United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968) ("there is nothing our courts can
do that will require foreign officers to abide by our Constitution"), cert denied,
395 U.S. 960 (1969). The Second Circuit has expressed a broader rule-the nonapplicability of the entire Bill of Rights to acts by foreign officials: "Although the
Bill of Rights does apply extraterritorially to protect American citizens against the
illegal conduct of United States agents, it does not and cannot protect our citizens
from the acts of a foreign sovereign committed within its territory." Rosado v.
Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1189 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted) (regarding due process
claim), cert denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
195. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969); see also Verdugo, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224-25 (9th Cir.
1988); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 1986), mod fled, 801 F.2d

378 (1986), cert dented, 480 U.S. 919 (1987); United States v. Paternina-Vergara,
749 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. dented, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985); United
States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 25 (Ist Cir.), cert dented, 461 U.S. 958 (1983);
United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 456
U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599-600 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 269-71 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977).
196. See generally articles cited supra note 193.
197. The district court concluded that the searches met all the criteria for a
Joint venture: "The DEA agents initiated the searches in order to obtain evidence
relevant to a criminal prosecution pending in the United States. The searches
were unrelated to any pending or contemplated Mexican criminal prosecution and
would not have been conducted by the [Mexican police] absent encouragement
from the DEA ....
The DEA agents participated extensively in the searches
themselves .... " Verdugo (S.D. Cal.), supra note 20.

1994]

AN INTERNATIONAL FOURTHAMENDMENT

377

rare departures from the federal courts' "virtually unanimous"198

practice of rejecting claims of joint participation.

Research for

this Article uncovered only a handful of cases in which a
nonmilitary court199 has found joint participation, 20 0 and only
one case prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Verdugo in which
a Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's exclusion of evidence
seized abroad.2 0 ' Thus, the "international silver platter" has
placed almost all searches in foreign states outside the Fourth
Amendment, effectively treating foreign officials as if they were
20 2
private citizens.
This "privatizing" of foreign officials, not surprisingly, has
contributed to the marginalizing of foreign law: if foreign officials
are, for Fourth Amendment purposes, no more than "private
individuals," then the laws by which they conduct their searches
necessarily must be immaterial to the Fourth Amendment

198. Verdugo, 856 F.2d at 1225 (citing United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d
120, 140 (5th Cir. 1976)).
199. For a discussion of the different approaches taken by nonmilitary courts,
see infra notes 344-49 and accompanying text.
200. Verdugo, 856 F.2d 1214, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Peterson,
812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 25 (1st
Cir.) (finding joint venture was "close question" where Coast Guard initiated highseas chase of suspected drug-smuggling vessel, asked for Canadian assistance,
provided back up as Canadians boarded, and then participated in second search
of the vessel), cert. dented, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that Fourth Amendment applied to Air Force discharge

proceeding in Japan, where Air Force investigators requested and obtained

Japanese search warrant and then joined, Japanese officers in executing it at Air
Force Employee's off-base dwelling); United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774,
781-82 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding United States participation sufficient because
beeper was installed at request of United States agents and investigation was
directed at United States citizens); Lau v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 98, 100-01
(D. P.R. 1991) (finding joint venture in joint United States-Dutch search where
"sole purpose" of foreign search was to obtain evidence for United States
prosecution), affd, 976 F.2d 724 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Orman, 417 F.
For a description of the broad range of
Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1976).
circumstances in which United States courts have refused to find joint
participation, see infra part V.A.
201. Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
202. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, "Fourth Amendment rights are generally
inapplicable to an action by a foreign sovereign in its own territory in enforcing its
own laws, even though American officials are present and cooperate in some
degree." Government of Canal Zone v. Sierra, 594 F.2d 60, 72 (5th Cir. 1979).
This is not true of searches and seizures on the high seas, which differ from
foreign-state searches in that they generally are conducted unilaterally by United
States agents and their high-seas location does not fall within the territorial
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, the concerns noted above about dual
sovereigns and dual laws do not arise. See generally Saltzburg, supra note 77;
Carmichael, supra note 9. But see United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 251 (9th
Cir. 1990) (assuming no distinction between foreign-state and high-seas searches,
citing Verdugo for proposition that Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches
of nonresident aliens in either location).
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inquiry. As one court has noted, weaving these two conceptual
threads together, "the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
arrests and searches made by Mexican officials in Mexico for
violation of Mexican law."20 3 On the rare occasions when it does

apply, the federal courts' governing assumption has been that
expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Verdugo and subsequently
echoed by Justice Brennan-that the Amendment applies in full
force, with all the per se rules that would govern a domestic
search, and "whether [the search] may also have violated [foreign]
law is irrelevant." 20 4
2. Abandoning the Silver Platter: The Double-illegality Approach
The binational approach would part with this practice.
Under this approach, an extraterritorial search by United States
agents would be declared constitutionally "unreasonable" only if it
were conducted in violation of both the Fourth Amendment
domestic standard and the law of the search jurisdiction-in
other words, "double illegality" would be required. 20 5 At the same
time, the requirement of joint participation would be relaxed: a
203. Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 382
U.S. 963 (1965).
204. Verdugo, 856 F.2d 1214, 1229 (9th Cir. 1988); see also 494 U.S. at 294
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. A similar approach was proposed In Harvard Note, supra note 15, at
1686-92. The closest the federal courts have come to such an approach is one
Ninth Circuit opinion by then-Judge Kennedy, which the Ninth Circuit has
subsequently declined to follow, which stated without citation that search
jurisdiction law should be incorporated into the definition of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987). In
Peterson, which concerned a joint investigation conducted by United States and
Philippine authorities, then-Judge Kennedy advanced the proposition that If
"United States agents' participation in the investigation is so substantial that the
action is a joint venture between United States and foreign officials, the law of the
foreign country must be consulted at the outset as part of the determination
whether or not the search was reasonable." Id. at 490. If the search were to
violate that law, the court concluded, it would be, "as a result, not reasonable
under the fourth amendment." Id. at 491. Although he found the search
unreasonable, Judge Kennedy refused nonetheless to exclude the search's fruits,
drawing on a "good faith" standard from the warrant context. See part V.B tnfra.
Judge Kennedy's suggestion was entirely unsupported by case law and has
not been followed. See Jonathan J. Cheatwood, Recent Development, 21 VAD. J.
TRANSMAT'L L. 631 (1988) (concluding that Peterson approach ignores precedent
and is bad policy). In Verdugo, the Ninth Circuit, while not overruling Peterson,
expressly declined the parties' invitation to follow Its approach, concluding
instead that the only relevant question before It was whether the search of
Verdugo's residence violated domestic Fourth Amendment standards. If the
search violated the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded, "whether It also may
have violated Mexican law is irrelevant." 856 F.2d at 1229. The parties briefed
the Mexican law issue again before the Supreme Court, but the Justices did not
address the issue.
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A double-illegality requirement would respond to some of the
concerns, canvassed above, of Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy

about the problems inherent in applying the Fourth Amendment

in a foreign state.2 0 7

First, a binational approach would be

directly responsive to Justice Kennedy's complaint about the
"impracticable and anomalous" aspects of applying United States
search-and-seizure standards abroad. Justice Kennedy objected
that imposing a United States warrant requirement for foreign
searches would be to impose foreign standards and foreign
procedures on local police, with whom United States police must
A "double-illegality" approach would
work cooperatively. 20 8
address these concerns directly. By excluding the fruit only of
"doubly illegal" searches, United States courts would refrain from
imposing on the search jurisdiction Fourth Amendment standards
that conflicted with local law. Instead, they would impose only
search-and-seizure standards and procedures that were common
to both states. Justice Kennedy's concerns would be addressed,
9
as would considerations of comity.20 Additionally, the approach
would facilitate cooperative transnational police work and the
gradual harmonization and regularlzation of transnational
criminal procedures. 2 10 Local police could carry out searches
206. Relaxation of the Joint participation standard is examined Infra part VA.
207. See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
208. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
209. Comity is the principle of interstate and international relations "under
which Judicial decisions reflect the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and
goodwill." Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatlale v. United States Dist Ct.,
As Justice
482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).

Blackmun noted, "[wihen there is a conflict [between domestic and foreign law], a

court should seek a reasonable accommodation that reconciles the central
concerns of both sets of laws." Id.; see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,
577 (1953) (declining to extend United States maritime statute where it would
conflict with Danish law, taking into account the alms of "stability and order" in
international and maritime law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6(2)
& cmt. d (1971) (listing "the needs of the interstate and international system" first
among seven governing factors in choice-of-law analysis). At least one federal
court has embraced a similar line of thought in the search-and-selzure context.
See United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp. 423, 437-38 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (holding
that, even though suppression was not constitutionally required, "considerations
of comity" required suppression of wiretap evidence obtained illegally by
Canadian police).
210. Ethan Nadelmann has described the harmonization of divergent law
enforcement systems as one of the chief goals of transnational law enforcement.
NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3, at 10 & passim. Harmonization
encompasses three kinds of processes: regularlzatfon of relations among law
enforcement officials of different states, accommodaton among systems that still
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requested by the United States in accordance with their own local
procedures (as required, for instance, by mutual assistance
treaties)2 11 without fear that the evidence would be thrown out of
a United States court because they failed to follow some detail of
United States search-and-seizure procedure.
While the binational approach would part with the general
practice of the federal courts,2 12 the kind of approach it embodies
would not be entirely foreign to United States courts. It would not
be incompatible, for instance,
with the choice-of-law
methodologies employed by state courts in response to searches
that cross state lines. 2 13 And it would be responsive, additionally,
to concerns about the nature of the Fourth Amendment and the
privacy interests that it protects.2 14 Justice Brennan's approach,
imposing United States search-and-seizure standards around the
globe, embodies the assumption that the Fourth Amendment
right to privacy is a universal right, uniform wherever it is
retain their essential differences, and homogenization of systems toward a
common norm. Id. at 10.
211. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
212. See supra part IV.A.1. But see Unfted States v. Salim, 663 F. Supp. 682,
688 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (Weinstein, J.) ("Judicial notice of the nature of a foreign
judicial system is appropriate on a motion to suppress evidence gathered
abroad.").
213. Since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), searches and seizures by state
police have been governed by a uniform federal constitutional standard; states,
however, have been free to develop their own individual constitutional or
statutory standards so long as these standards pass the minimal federal
threshold. This promulgation of state-by-state standards creates the potential for
clashes among states that have selected standards of varying stringency. When
these clashes occur, choice-of-law issues are raised that are similar to those
raised in the transnational context.

While state courts have not employed consistent methodologies In struggling
with the questions that arise in this context, they have at least grappled with the
choice-of-law issues in a way that has not happened in the transnational context.
State courts have not categorically concluded, as have federal courts considering
extraterritorial searches, that the only applicable law is that of the forum.
Instead, they have employed a variety of methodologies, borrowed from civil
choice-of-law jurisprudence, to assess whether forum or search-jurisdiction law
should be applied in a particular interstate search context. In particular, the
cases show that a straight forum-law approach need not necessarily and
unavoidably be employed. Instead, search-jurisdiction law may on occasion be
employed when the interests of the two jurisdictions (however calculated) so
indicate. Or neither of the two standards may be employed, when application of
the federal standard is judged more appropriate. See generally 1 LAFAVE, supra
note 53, § 1.5(c); John B. Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 73
GEO. L.J. 1217 (1985); William H. Theis, Choice of Law and the Administration of
the Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Cases, TENN. L. REV. 1043, 1060-61 (1977);
Richard Tullis & Linda Ludlow, Admisslbility of Evidence Seized in Another
Jursdictlon: Choice of Law and the Exclusionary Rule, U.S.F. L. REV. 87, 88
(1975).
214. Justice Kennedy alluded to these concerns when he noted "the
differing ... conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad."
494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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imposed; in fact, this misconstrues the nature of the privacy that
While the principle of
the Fourth Amendment protects.
"mutuality" that Brennan invokes is sound-individuals acquire
rights against the United States when United States agents seek
to enforce United States law against them2 1 5-it is not necessarily
the case that these rights remain the same regardless of the
location of United States action. 2 16 The expectations of privacy
that the Fourth Amendment protects are not, as the Department
of Justice noted in its brief in Verdugo, "free-floating concepts
Instead, they are
capable of universal application." 2 17
particularized, socially determined expectations--"expectations,"
as the Supreme Court put it in the landmark case of Katz v.
United States,2 18 "that society is prepared to consider
reasonable."2 19 These expectations "must have a source outside
of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real
or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
22 0
and permitted by society."
Thus, while the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
"unreasonable searches and seizures," what is "unreasonable" in
the United States 2 2 1 may not be unreasonable in Mexico or Sri
Lanka.222 Each society's determination of what searches it will
215. See suprapart II.B.2.

216. Justice Kennedy raised this point in his Verdugo concurrence. See 494
U.S. at 277 ("there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily
apply in all circumstances in every foreign place-) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
217. Brief for the United States, supra note 3, at *20.
218. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
219. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), adopted by a major/ty of the court in
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
220. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978). As Justice Harlan
has noted, "[ojur expectations [of privacy], and the risks we assume, are in large
part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the
past and present." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See generally BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL HISTORY (1984); see also Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not an Isolated
Freedom, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 71, 71 (J.R. Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1971) ("As a value privacy does not exist in isolation, but is part and parcel of the
system of values that regulates action in society."); Note, 6 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 154,
179-80 (1972) ("the realization of privacy is itself very much a product of life in a
human community, made possible through the operation of socialization and
social controls. The quantity and quality of seclusion available to an individual or
group are socially and culturally determined, and in that sense society and
culture may be said to dictate what sorts of privacy one may reasonably expect.").
221. It should be noted that the Fourth Amendment imposes a national, not
local, standard of reasonableness; potential local differences, such as a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in New York City versus a reasonable
expectation in Des Moines, are not taken into account. Harvard Note, supra note
15, at 1686.
222. It is "obvious that the political system in each society will be a
fundamental force in shaping its balance of privacy, since certain patterns of
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consider unreasonable is the product of a highly individualized
calculus, the result of balancing the amount of individual privacy
and security that society is "prepared to consider reasonable"
against the legitimate needs of government and law
enforcement. 2 23 These societal understandings should not travel
with the government to foreign states, as Justice Brennan (and
some commentators) 2 24 would have it; rather, they should remain
embedded in the locale in which each individual finds himself. A
foreign citizen, or even a United States citizen in a foreign state,
should not be able to claim the same expectation of privacy
abroad that he could claim in the United States; if he can have no
legitimate expectation that Mexican police will not break into his
house without a warrant, then why should he be accorded a
greater expectation of privacy as against United States police? 2 2 5
privacy, disclosure, and surveillance are functional necessities for particular
kinds of political regime." ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23 (1967).
"American patterns of privacy are, in the main, the end products of a long period
of cultural development" and "it is very clear that our view of privacy as a set of
rules against intrusion and surveillance focused on the household occupied by a
nuclear family is a conception which is not to be found universally in all
societies." John M. Roberts & Thomas Gregor, Privacy: A CulturalView, in NoMos
XIII: PRIVAcY 199, 224-25 (J.R. Pennock & John W.Chapman eds., 1971).
223. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of Its impact on the
individual's sense of security [must be] balanced against the utility of the conduct
as a technique of law enforcement"). A court cannot usually make such an
assessment without conducting a broad-ranging inquiry encompassing not only
legal precedent but, in many cases, contemporary and historical social practices,
customs and understandings, and fundamental social values.
See, e.g.,
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-22 (1985) (concluding, in light of the common

law (going back to Blackstone), criminological studies, the changing technology of
law enforcement, and analyses of state laws and the policies of various police
departments, that the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently
unarmed suspected felon constitutes an unreasonable seizure); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-80 (1984) (examining the Framers' intent, the language
of the Fourth Amendment and its origins in the common law, "societal
understandings," values "embedded in our traditions," and historical and
contemporary uses of open fields, in assessing the continuing validity of the "open
fields" doctrine, which allows police to search open fields without a warrant).
224. E.g., Saltzburg, supra note 77, at 763.
225. An additional objection may be addressed here-the argument that
United States courts should not exclude evidence for violations of foreign searchand-seizure laws when the state whose law is violated does not Itself employ the
exclusionary remedy. See Saltzburg, supra note 77, at 765 ("The failure of most
foreign countries to suppress illegally seized evidence in their own courts ...
strongly suggests that U.S. courts do them a disservice by excluding the same
evidence."). This argument should be rejected, however, just as the Supreme
Court rejected the same argument in the federal-state context. In Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Court abolished the state-to-federal silver
platter and instituted the exclusionary remedy in federal court for evidence seized
unconstitutionally by state police. In so doing, it concluded that it would make
no difference whether the state in question had adopted the exclusionary rule, for
"[lIn states which have not adopted the exclusionary rule ....
It would work no
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To do so is to violate the principle, familiar to Fourth Amendment
law, that an individual can have no greater legitimate expectation
of privacy against the government than he has against the rest of
the world.2 2 6 It is also to provide United States law enforcement
agents with a powerful inducement for subterfuge and
evasion-the inducement to hand off their search authority to
the constitutional standards to
local police in an attempt to evade
227
which they are held accountable.
3. Implementing the Double-Illegality Approach
A binational approach need not be unduly burdensome. The
heart of the approach, as noted above, is that foreign searches
would be declared unlawful only if they violated both Fourth
Amendment domestic standards and the laws of the search
jurisdiction. This requirement could be implemented through a
bifurcated suppression hearing at which the defendant would
have the opportunity to demonstrate the "double illegality" of the
search. Unlike suppression hearings for domestic searches, the
burden of demonstrating that the search violated both
jurisdictions' standards would fall on the defendant.22 8 The
government, in response, would need to show only that the
defendant had failed to meet his burden of proof with regard to
one or the other of these contentions.

conflict with local policy for a federal court to decline to receive evidence
unlawfully seized by state officers. [The Court's remedy] affects not at all the
freedom of the states to develop and apply their own sanctions in their own way."

Id. at 221. The Court's reasoning is equally applicable to the transnational
context, particularly in light of the fact that both the binational and international
approaches enforce only policies common to both states.
226. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (holding that,

because individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage as
against garbage collectors, they have no such interest as against police);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding that, since individual

had no reasonable expectation that his backyard would be secure from aerial
surveillance by commercial aircraft, he had no such legitimate expectation
against aerial police surveillance). Accord Harvard Note, supra note 15, at 1688.
227. See Infra notes 349-52 and accompanying text.
228. This allocation of the burden of proof would differ somewhat from the
burden in motions to suppress evidence obtained within the United States. In
domestic suppression hearings, the defendant carries the burden of proof of
demonstrating illegality only if the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant.
3 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 123, § 675, at 782-83. Where the defendant
challenges a warrantless search, the burden falls on the United States to bring
the case within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. For foreign
searches, however, placing the burden on the government to demonstrate the
-reasonableness" of its search would be less appropriate in light of separation-ofpowers concerns about judicial involvement in foreign affairs, see infra part V.C.,
as well as concerns about proving foreign law, see infra this section.
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The primary element that would be added to the suppression

proceedings, along with the shifting of the burden of proof, would
be the need to prove foreign law. Proof of foreign law, while not a
practice that has always been enthusiastically embraced by
United States courts,2 29 is nevertheless now an accepted and
regular part of the courts' business. 23 o Since 1966, the federal

rules of civil and criminal procedure 23 1 have provided courts with
a relatively informal and effective procedure for determining
foreign law, replacing the previous, highly cumbersome approach
in which courts treated questions of foreign law as issues of fact,
to be pleaded and proved in accordance with the rules of
23 2
evidence.
The "fact" approach was fundamentally changed by the
promulgation of Civil Rule 44.1 and Criminal Rule 26.1. These
rules allow courts to consider any relevant source of information,
without regard to whether it is submitted by a party or whether it
would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.23
Additionally, they allow courts to conduct their own research into

229. For the classic statement on the alien and Indecipherable nature of
foreign law, see Diaz v. Gonzalez y Lugo, 261 U.S. 102, 106 (1923) (Holmes, J.)
("When we contemplate such a system [the law of Puerto Rico] from the outside it
seems like a wall of stone... except so far as our own local education may lead
us to see subordinations to which we are accustomed. But to one brought up
within it, varying emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand
influences gained only from life, may give to the different parts wholly new values
that logic and grammar never could have got from the books.").
230. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 123, § 431 (proof of foreign law In
criminal cases), §§ 2441-47 (civil cases); John R. Brown, 44.1 Ways to Prove
Foreign Law, 9 MAR. LAW. 179, 196 (1984) (view of court of appeals judge that
revised rules of procedure have "untied the hands of judges"); Arthur R. Miller,
FederalRule 44.1 and the "Fact"Approachto Determining ForeignLaw: Death Knell
for a Die-HardDoctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 613, 634 (1967) (conclusion by drafter of
new rules that judicial attitudes toward proving foreign law had softened); Milton
Pollack, Proof of Foreign Law, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 470 (1978) (federal trial judge's
view that proof of foreign law is workable under revised rules); Stephen L. Sass,
ForeignLaw In Federal Courts, 29 Am. J. COMP. L. 97 (1981) (same by academic
commentator).
231. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1 (governs proof of foreign law in criminal matters);
FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (virtually identical, governs in civil matters).
232. Brown, supra note 230, at 180-83.
Proof was usually made by
examination and cross-examination of expert witnesses on the law of the foreign
state. This approach was inefficient, expensive, and highly constrictive. Id. at
181-82.
233. Both the civil and criminal rules provide that "[tihe court, in determining
foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of
law." FED. R. CRim. P. 26.1; FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1; see also 9 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 123, § 2444.
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foreign law, just as they do with domestic law.2 3 4 The purpose of
these changes is to make the process of determining foreign law
as similar as possible to the process of determining domestic
law.2 3 5 The court may consider any material the parties wish to
present. The most frequently used method of proof is submission
of experts' affidavits along with copies of relevant foreign statutes
and judicial decisions in the original as well as in English
translation. 23 6
The key to a workable binational approach to extraterritorial
searches and seizures would be to place on the defendant, who is
seeking to suppress evidence as a violation of foreign search-andseizure law, not only the burden of proofZ37 but also the burden
of submitting sufficient evidence of foreign law to provide clear
3
United States courts lack the
substantiation of his claim.m
resources and the skills, both linguistic and juridical, to conduct
their own inquiries into foreign law;23 9 additionally, principles of
comity should make United States courts leery of issuing
pronouncements on the meaning of other states' laws unless they
are supported by unequivocal pronouncements from the foreign
states' legislatures or courts. Accordingly, the foreign law-finding
234. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1; FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1; see also 9 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 123, § 2444.
235. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 123, § 2444; see also Pollack, supra note
230, at 473 (suggesting that advocates argue foreign law "Just as you would with
domestic law").
236. Sass, supra note 230, at 108 & n.53. See, e.g., Argyll Shipping Co. v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 125, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (English translation of
Japanese Commercial Code and affidavits of Japanese attorneys). Where the law
appears clear, courts have sometimes been willing to dispense with affidavits of
foreign counsel and base their Judgments of foreign law solely on secondary
sources, such as treatises on foreign law. E.g., Forzley v. Avco Corp. Electronics
Div., 826 F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1987) (relying solely on treatise to determine Saudi
law).
A significant additional tool for determining foreign law Is available to
European courts under the European Convention on Information on Foreign Law,
1968, Europ. T.S. No. 62. Under the Convention, each of the participating
countries establishes a "national liaison body," usually within the Ministry of
Justice, to respond to requests from foreign courts for determinations on the law
of that state. Id. Accession to the treaty by the United States would significantly
expedite the process of determining foreign law.
237. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
238. See Pollack, supra note 230, at 475 ("A lawyer relying on the law of a
foreign country has a distinctive burden with respect to furnishing legal material
to the court"; see also Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155
n.3 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.) ("Though new Rule 44.1 establishes that courts
may, in their discretion, examine foreign legal sources independently, it does not
require them to do so in the absence of any... help from the parties.").
239. See Pollack, supra note 230, at 470-72 ("Judges with few exceptions
don't know foreign law, and generally lack an informed idea of how to find it out
on their own"); Sass, supra note 230, at 109-10 (concluding that courts have been
reluctant to engage in their own research of foreign law).

386

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:329

burden should be shifted to the defendant, and evidence should
be suppressed -only when the defendant has produced clear
evidence of the illegality of the search under foreign law in the
form of a clear statutory or judicial pronouncement on the
matter. 2 40 By requiring clear proof of illegality, United States
courts would be able to avoid entangling themselves in broadranging inquiries into other societies' fundamental values and
"expectations of privacy," of the sort common to domestic Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 2 41 If a defendant failed to submit
clear proof of illegality, the court could admit the challenged
evidence on the ground that the defendant had failed to carry his
2 42
burden.
Various issues, of course, would remain to be faced under a
double-illegality approach.
One such issue would concern
extraterritorial warrants;2 43 another, what weight to give to
foreign search-and-seizure laws that are on the books but which
go routinely unenforced; 24 4 a third, the possibility that foreign-

240. For cases in which courts have dismissed claims for lack of clear proof of
foreign law, see, e.g., Esso Standard Oil v. S.S. Gasbras Sul, 387 F.2d 573, 580
(2d Cir. 1967) (rejecting claim because no Guatemalan case was presented
construing provisions of Guatemalan Accident Law on which expert testimony
conflicted), cerL denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968); Gates v. P.F. Collier, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 204, 213 (D. Haw. 1966) (dismissing for failure to prove applicability of
Japanese statute to case's particular facts by citing Japanese cases or
administrative decisions), affd, 378 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1038 (1968); see also Sass, supra note 230, at 111-12.
241. See supra note 223.
242. Pollack, supra note 230, at 472 (citations omitted) ("If the foreign law is
asserted but not adequately demonstrated, the Court is entitled to ask the parties
for more material. If the response is unsatisfactory, there is venerable authority
for concluding that the party relying on the foreign law has failed to prove his
claim or defense.").
243. See supra text accompanying notes 117-29.
Verdugo, of course,
dispensed with the warrant requirement for extraterritorial searches of
noncitizens. Nevertheless, if the courts were to adopt the double-Illegality
approach, a rethinking of the Verdugo rule on warrants would be in order. A rule
more consonant with the double-Ilegality approach, in situations in which the
laws of both states required a warrant, would be to require that a magistrate of
one state or the other issue a warrant. See Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d
738, 746 (9th Cir. 1968) (acknowledging that Philippine warrant, If "properly
prepared, might have satisfied Constitutional requirements'), cert. dented, 395
U.S. 960 (1969); Raffel, supra note 193, at 715-17 (arguing constitutionality of
foreign warrants meeting Fourth Amendment standards). As with the binational
approach generally, this is a rule that might most easily be implemented by
statute.
244. Nonenforcement may be the result of systemic corruption.
For a
comprehensive discussion of how United States drug enforcement agents work
with corrupt foreign police, see NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3,
at 251-312. Conceivably, when faced with such "paper laws," the government
might be allowed to rebut the defendant's case by submitting evidence of nonenforcement of the local law.
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state searches could be conducted in compliance with local law
2 45
and yet nonetheless offend minimal standards of decency.
Nonetheless, by transferring the law-finding burden to defendants
who seek to suppress evidence on the grounds of foreign-law
violations, courts would so substantially reduce their own burden
of proving foreign law that the difficulties of implementation
would appear eminently surmountable.

B. The Human Rights Approach: An InternationalBenchmark
An alternative approach would be to incorporate fundamental
principles of international human rights law into the Fourth
Amendment's standard of reasonableness-to create a truly
"international Fourth Amendment" governing extraterritorial
searches and seizures, a benchmark founded on fundamental
international human rights norms and on the shared search-andseizure standards of the world's major legal systems. Such an
approach would, like the binational approach, be responsive to
the concerns expressed in Part II that United States courts should
not have to choose between imposing a foreign standard on the
search jurisdiction or applying no law at all. Courts instead could
apply a standard shared by both states-a standard derived from
globally accepted norms of conduct.
An international benchmark approach would enjoy some
advantages over the binational approach discussed above. Most
obviously, it would relieve United States courts of the burden of
construing dozens of foreign search-and-seizure laws and of
applying a different standard for every state within which United
States agents operate. Instead, a unitary standard would be
developed. This would have at least two advantages. 2 46 First,
development of the standard could readily be entrusted to a
commission or other scholarly organization, 2 47
and an
international organization, such as Interpol, could coordinate

training of police in the standard.
significantly,

the

case

law

Second, and perhaps more

construing

the

international

245. United States courts recognize a hypothetical exception to the
international silver platter for searches in which foreign officials engage in
conduct that "shocks the conscience." See United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780,
783 (9th C1r. 1981); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 25 (Ist Cr.), cert.
dented, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); Brdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10
(5th Cir.), cert. dented, 382 U.S. 963 (1965). A similar exception to the doubleillegality rule should be construed for situations in which local search-andseizure law diverges fundamentally from Fourth Amendment principles.
246. On the debit side, of course, would be the difficulties involved in
construing a unitary standard.
See discussion tnfra notes 267-77 and
accompanying text.
247. See Infra note 277.
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benchmark, unlike the binational approach, would have a
"prescriptive" effect-that is, every judicial opinion construing the
legality of a transnatlonal search or seizure would contribute to a

growing case law defining permissible global standards of conduct
for transnatlonal searches and seizures.

This unitary standard

would apply to transnational searches and seizures everywhere

and could contribute to the rationalization and harmonization of
world search-and-seizure law.
An international benchmark approach would be novel, but
not unprecedented, in United States jurisprudence. 2 8 United
States courts on a number of occasions in recent years have
looked to international human rights norms either directly, as a
source of rights for individual plaintiffs, or indirectly, as a means
of giving substance to broad constitutional or statutory rights.2 49

248. International law has been considered part of United States law since
the founding. The classic statement of the place of international law In United
States courts is The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for determination").
249. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.
1992), cert denied sub nom. Marcos-Manotoc v. Trajano, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993)
(affirming judgment against daughter of former Philippine president for torture of
plaintfi's son, as violation of peremptory norm of international law); Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-17 (9th Cr. 1992) (finding
state-sponsored torture to be violation of peremptory norm of International law);
Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (examining whether United States failure to abide by decision of
International Court of Justice was violation of international law); Tel-Oren V.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinion of Edwards, J.)
(finding state-sponsored torture to be violation of peremptory norm of
international law), cert. dented, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Id. at 820 (opinion of Bork,
J.) (same); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding peremptory
international norm against state-sponsored torture, thus conferring federal
jurisdiction under Alien Tort Claims Act over suit against Paraguayan official for
torture committed in Paraguay); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (peremptory norm forbids official torture), modifted, 694 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980)
(finding extended detention of Cuban "Marielito" pending deportation to be
violation of international law norms prohibiting arbitrary detention), affid on other

grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wlldnson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.
1981).
See generally Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, InternationalHuman Rights
Law in United States Courts: A ComparativePerspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1
(1992); Brilmayer, supra note 59; Harold H. Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil
Wrongs, supra note 177; Harold H. Koh, TransnatonalPublic Law Litgation, 100
YALE L.J. 2347 (1991); Richard B. Lillich, International Human Rights Law In
Domestic Courts, 54 U. CiN. L. REv. 367 (1985); Jules Lobel, The Limits of
ConstitutionalPower Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71
VA. L. REV. 1071 (1985); Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of
the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982).
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Reference to international law is particularly appropriate when
the issue under consideration involves actions outside United
States territory or a determination of the rights of noncitizens. 25 0
A few commentators have suggested that an international-lawbased approach might be a productive alternative to the
approaches assayed by the Verdugo Court.2 5 ' This section will
explore briefly how such an approach might work.
1. The Foundation of the International Benchmark: The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Three principal sources of international law are generally
recognized: 25 2 1) international agreements; 2) customary

It bears repeating that the Supreme Court has been less hospitable In recent
years to claims of violation of international law. See Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, 113 S. Ct 2549 (1993) (holding that human rights covenant prohibiting
"return" of refugees did not apply to United States action outside United States
territorial waters); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct 2188 (1992)
(deciding claim of illegal abduction on narrow grounds of treaty interpretation and

declining to reach broader claim that defendant's rights under customary
international law had been violated).
250. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir.
1981) (noting that Supreme Court has turned to international law when addressing rights of aliens); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893)
("By the law of nations ... aliens residing in a country, with the intention of making it a permanent place of abode, acquire, in one sense, a domicil there.., and
may invoke its protection against other nations ...
."); Lau Ow Bew v. United
States, 144 U.S. 47, 61-62 (1892) ("By general international law, foreigners who
"); see
have become domiciled in a country other than their own, acquire rits...
also New York Bar Report, supra note 53, at 508-10 (above-cited decisions
"suggest that the Court should look to international human rights law in the
course of applying the Bill of Rights to non-citizens").
251. See Neuman, supra note 12, at 989 (raising, but not endorsing, the idea);
New York Bar Report, supra note 53, at 509-13; Wedgwood, supra note 53, at
755. These commentators do not explore how such an approach might be
attempted.
252. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38; FOREIGN
RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 102. According to the Forefgn Relations
Restatement, these sources produce obligations upon states to respect human
rights: "A state is obligated to respect the human rights of persons subject to its
jurisdiction (a) that it has undertaken to respect by international agreement; (b)
that states generally are bound to respect as a matter of customary international
law; and (c) that it is required to respect under general principles of law common
to the major legal systems of the world." Id. § 701.
For the Supreme Court's classic statement of the sources of international law
in United States courts, see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900):
"Where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and,
as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of
labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat."
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international law;253 and 3) "general principles of law recognized

by civilized nations."2 54 An international benchmark approach
would draw primarily on the first of these, relying on the United
States recent ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.255
Most of the contemporary international law of human rights
rests on multilateral conventions and declarations adopted after
World War II, purporting to guarantee certain basic rights to all
people. 25 6 Primary among these, and often described, collectively
or individually, as the "International Bill of Rights,"257 are the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,258 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.259

253. Customary international law is said to result from a "general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 102(2).
On customary

International law generally, see Committee of U.S. Citizens In Nicaragua v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988); ANTHONY A. D'AMATo, THE CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of
Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986); Arthur M. Weisburd,
Customary InternationalLaw: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1
(1988).
254. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1); FOREIGN
RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 102(4). See also Howard S. Schrader,
Note, Custom and General Principlesas Sources of InternationalLaw In Amerian
FederalCourts, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 751 (1982). This source of international norms
is traditionally accorded a peripheral, "gap-filling" role. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38(13(d) (general principles as a "subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law"); Schrader, supra, at 769-79.
255. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter International Covenant). The United States ratified
in 1992. See tnfra notes 263-64. Although treaties, as one form of state practice,
may constitute customary international law, see Weisburd, supra note 253, the
United States ratification of the International Covenant has made it unnecessary
to determine whether the Covenant's provisions rise to this level. On this subject,
see FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, Part VII, intro, note
(principles in Universal Declaration and International Covenant may constitute
customary international law since United States has frequently reiterated Its
acceptance of these principles and has also generally followed them). Any
attempt to construe a customary international law of searches and seizures would
face severe hurdles, as United States courts have reserved the appellation for only
the most heinous international wrongs. See Id. § 702; Trimble, supra note 253, at
684-87. The methodology associated with customary international law, however,
may be used to give concrete meaning to the Covenant's broad provisions. See
Infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
256. See generally LouIs HENKIN, THEAGE OF RIGHTS 1-29 (1989).
257. See THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITIcAL RIGHTS (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
258. Signed Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
259. International Covenant, supra note 255. In addition, the United Nations

has drafted more than thirty human rights conventions since the Universal
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The Universal Declaration and the International Covenant
purport to guarantee to all individuals a broad range of
fundamental rights, not unlike those guaranteed by the United
States Bill of Rights, including: self-determination; the right to
vote; the right to life, liberty, and security of person; the right to a
fair trial; freedom of conscience, expression, and assembly; and
equal protection of the law. 2 6 0 The Universal Declaration, drafted
in the wake of the Nuremburg trials and the creation of the
United Nations and approved without dissent by all member
states, was conceived not as binding law but as "a common
standard of achievement" to which all states might aspire. 2 6 1 The
International Covenant was to be the vehicle by which these
ideals would be converted into binding covenant.
The drafting and adoption of the Covenant however, proved to
be a case study in delay. The drafting took eighteen years, and
produced a bifurcation of the originally envisioned document into
two covenants.2 6 2 It was not until 1975 that the Covenant
obtained the number of adherents necessary to bring it into
effect,2 63 and not until 1977 that the United States signed the
Covenant and President Carter transmitted it to the Senate. The
Covenant then stalled in Congress for fifteen years until 1992
when, with the Cold War over, the Senate finally provided the
necessary advice and consent.
President Bush ratified the
Covenant, 26 4 and it entered into force for the United States on
September 8, 1992.265 Thus, beginning on that date, the ideals of
the Universal Declaration, which before then had legal force in
2 66
the United States, if at all, as customary international law,
became, in modified form, binding treaty provisions.
Declaration, and has issued an equal number of human rights declarations and
resolutions. International human rights are conferred as well by regional human
rights charters and agreements, such as the Organization of American States
Charter and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. This
Article will not examine the possibility of an international search-and-seizure

standard based on regional agreements.
260. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 258, arts. 2-20;

International Covenant, supra note 255, arts. 1-19, 21-22. Both documents also
include a number of provisions that go beyond those set out in the Bill of Rights.
See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra, arts. 22 (right to social security), 23 (right
to work), 25 (right to adequate standard of living), 26 (right to education).
261. See Louis Henkin, Introduction, In INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 257, at 9.
262. Id. at 8-11.
263. Id. at 11.
264. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL

COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITIcAL RIGHTS, S. ExEc. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 649 (1992) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT).
265. Id., 31 I.L.M. at 645. The Senate gave its advice and consent on April 2,
1992, and on June 8, 1992 the Bush administration deposited its instrument of
ratification. Id.
266. See nfra note 255.
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Construing the Covenant, however, is a thorny proposition,
and, as of the date of this writing, no state or federal court had
engaged in such an exercise. 267 Two issues are of foremost
importance in this regard: first, giving concrete meaning to the
Covenant's broad generalities; and second, addressing the
declaration by the United States that the Covenant is not selfexecuting.
Nothing in the language of the Covenant directly resembles
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement or its right "to be
secure... against unreasonable searches and seizures." 26 8 Two
provisions, however, touch in a general way on the area of
searches and seizures. Article 17 (incorporated from Article 12 of
the Universal Declaration) provides that:
"No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence....
Everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."26 9
Additionally, Article 9(1) states that "[no one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest or detention."2 7 O
The meaning of these provisions, in the absence of case law
interpreting them, is of course far from clear. A right to be free
from "arbitrary or unlawful interference with [one's] privacy,
family, home or correspondence" is every bit as cryptic as the
Fourth Amendment's protection against "unreasonable searches
and seizures," and the Article lacks the Fourth Amendment's
additional warrant requirement. 2 7 1 A court that wanted to find
significant protections in Article 17 certainly could conclude, for
example, that a warrantless search Is an "arbitrary or unlawful
interference with [one's] privacy." On the other hand, a court
could reasonably refuse to deem a search "arbitrary" as long as
the police had some rational basis for their action. It is clear that

the meaning of these provisions will have to be built on a case by
case basis with help from outside the document itself.
The problem would be similar in some respects to that
historically faced by the federal courts in determining whether the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated particular provisions of the

267. A search of the MEGA file in the LEXIS database revealed no opinions in
any state or federal court construing the International Covenant since its
ratification by the United States.
For a representative trealment of the
International Covenant prior to its ratification, which would apply equally
following its entry into force, see DeNegri v. Republic of Chile, Civ. No. 86-3085,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233, at *7-9 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1992) (concluding that
International Covenant does not set forth cause of action or provide waiver of
immunity against foreign state in United States courts).
268. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
269. International Covenant, supra note 255, art. 17.
270. Id. art 9(1).
271. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Bill of Rights against the states. 2 7 2

Just as the federal courts

determined what provisions of the Bill of Rights were "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty"27 3 or "so rooted in the traditions

2
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," 74
so too the courts would need to determine what search-andseizure standards have become part of the "general and
consistent practice of states."2 75 The endeavor, of course, would
be significantly more complex than the Fourteenth Amendment
inquiry, given that United States courts would not merely be
construing one legal/cultural tradition but instead looking for
standards common to many. The courts would need to employ a
methodology traditionally used by courts construing customary
international law or "general principles of law" and examine the
search-and-seizure practices of the world's major legal systems,
with an eye for shared practices that embody common
principles. 2 78 In this endeavor they might be assisted by the

272. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted in its report on the
International Covenant that "[tihe rights guaranteed by the Covenant are similar
to those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights." SENATE

REPORT, supra note 264, at 2.
273. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (reviewing
provisions of Bill of Rights which Fourteenth Amendment incorporates against the
states as "Implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27-28 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society.
It is therefore implicit in the 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause").
274. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
275. This phrase, of course, constitutes one of the two requirements for
customary international law, the other being that the state practice is "followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation." See supranote 253. I do not suggest that
courts must conclude that particular search-and-seizure standards have reached
the status of customary international law; that burden has been lifted by the
United States ratification of the International Covenant Instead, it is suggested
that courts turn to the general practice of states, as they do in construing
customary international law or general principles, for Illumination of the
Covenant's broad meanings. See People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of
Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974) (for guidance in construing vague terms
of international agreement, court may look to relevant statutes and to "the
relevant principles of international law ... which have achieved a substantial
degree of codification and consensus").
276. Courts occasionally have employed this methodology as a subsidiary
means of finding customary international law. See, e.g., The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 170, 188 (1872) (concluding that certain rules of navigation, having been
accepted by the two states involved in the case and "accepted as obligatory rules
by more than thirty of the principle commercial states of the world," had
accordingly become, "in part at least ... the laws of the sea"); Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cr. 1980) (taking note that torture had been banned
in over fifty-five national constitutions, in concluding that official torture was
violation of customary international law).
One comparative study suggests that a considerable number of states have

adopted provisions comparable in some respects to the Fourth Amendment. See
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Human Rights Committee, the quasi-judicial body established
77
under the Covenant to monitor compliance with its provisions.2
The second major difficulty United States courts would face
in attempting to build an international benchmark from the
Covenant would be the United States understanding of it as a
"non-self-executing" treaty. In its resolution of ratification, the
United States declared that the Covenant would be non-selfexecuting; that is, it would not create a private cause of action in
United States courts. 2 78
This declaration accords with the
prevailing understanding in United States courts that human
rights conventions, even if adopted by the United States, are not
SANDRA HERTZBERG & CARMELA ZAMMUTO, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE
CRIMINAL PROCESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
42 & chart IV (1981). Fewer states (as of 1980, only thirty-five, about one-fifth of
the states of the world) have adopted some kind of exclusionary rule. The total
rises to sixty-seven states (forty-two percent of the world's states) when one adds
the states that have adopted international human rights instruments that
embrace an exclusionary rule. Id. On comparative criminal procedure generally,
see JOHN LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

GERMANY (1977); MirJan

Damaska, The Structure of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure,84 YALE
L.J. 480 (1975); R. Thomas Farrar, Aspects of Police Search and Seizure Without
Warrant in Englandand the United States, 29 MIAMI L. REV. 491 (1975).
277. See generally D. MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (1991). The
Committee is an eighteen-member body elected for four-year terms by the state
parties to the Covenant. Among other duties, It reviews the reports that the state
parties are required to submit on the measures they have adopted to give effect to
the Covenant, and it may consider complaints of violations lodged against
accepting states. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 264, at 3, 31 I.L.M. at 649
(noting that United States accepts Committee's competence to hear states'
complaints about noncompliance).
278. SENATE REPORT, supra note 264, at 23, 31 I.L.M. at 659. The declaration
is as follows: "IT]he United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1
through 27 of the Covenant [those articles that guarantee rights and prohibit
activities] are not self-executing." Id. As the Bush Administration explained,
"(tihe intent Is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action
in U.S. courts." Id. at 19, 31 I.L.M. at 657. The declaration was one of the four
declarations, five reservations, and a five-point "understanding' that were
included in the United States instrument of ratification. None of these other
conditions related to searches and seizures. Id. at 6-21, 31 I.L.M. at 651-58.
Additionally, a proviso was appended to the Senate's resolution of ratification but
not included in the instrument of ratification deposited by President Bush. It
provides that "[n]othing in this Covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or
other action, by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States as interpreted by the United States." Id. at 24, 31 I.L.M. at 660.
The proviso is in accord with the overall understanding, expressed throughout the
Senate report and instrument of ratification, that ratification of the Covenant
should work no change In existing domestic standards of human rights within the
United States, but rather that, where the Covenant differs from existing United
States law, a reservation is to make clear that the United States incurs no new
human rights obligations by ratifying. Id. at 4, 31 I.L.M. at 650 ("The
overwhelming majority of the provisions in the Covenant are compatible with the
existing United States domestic law. In those few areas where the two diverge,
the Administration has proposed a reservation or other form of condition to clarify
the nature of the obligation being undertaken by the United States.").
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generally enforceable through a private right of action unless the
instrument, explicitly or implicitly, provides for one.279
This declaration clearly would prevent both aliens and United
States citizens from suing in United States courts on causes of
action derived from the Covenant.28 0 It would not, however,
prevent a nonresident alien from invoking the Covenant as an aid
to interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement. United States courts have been far more receptive
to international law when it has been raised not as a source of
rights in opposition to United States legislative or executive action
but as an aid in the interpretation of constitutional or statutory
standards.28l
This approach-the
so-called
"indirect
incorporation" of international law2 8 2-- is consistent with the
settled principle that domestic law should be construed to avoid a
violation of international law. 28 3 United States courts have looked
to international standards, for instance, as an aid to interpreting
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' commandments
regarding prison conditions; 28 4 to construing the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment,28 5

279. See FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 907 & cmt a
("international agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons,

generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in
domestic courts"). See also Sel Fujil v. California, 242 P.2d 617, 621-22 (Cal.
1952) (United Nations Charter held to "lack the mandatory quality and
definiteness which would indicate an intent to create Justiciable rights in private
persons immediately upon ratification); FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra

note 16, § 701 and reporters' note 5.
280. See supra notes 278-79.
281. See Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 249, at 23-27, 72-80; Lillich,
supra note 249, at 408-12; Ralph G. Stelnhardt, The Role of InternatonolLaw as a
Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction,42 VAND. L. REv. 1103 (1990).

282. Lillich, supra note 249, at 408.
283. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) ("an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains").
284. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 n.8 (1976) (looking to
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in
reaching conclusion that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners is proscribed by Eighth Amendment); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp.
1177 (D. Conn. 1980) (applying United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners to prison overcrowding governed by Fourteenth
Amendment due process standard, and concluding that these rules were relevant
to the "canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice"
embodied in the Due Process Clause), affd in part & modified In part, 651 F.2d 96
(2d Cir. 1981).
285. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that punishment of loss of nationality for military desertion violated
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, in light of
fact that "Itihe civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime").
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particularly with reference to the death penalty;2 8 8 to interpreting
immigration

laws;2 8

7

and to

interpreting

the

bounds of due

28

8 among other topics. 28 9
Such incorporation of
international norms has been resisted by United States courts on
process,

occasions when to do so would have placed Congress In violation
of international law.290 But this would not be the likely result of
an international search-and-seizure benchmark, since any
standard construed from the common elements of the world's
search-and-seizure laws would, almost by definition, be less
demanding than domestic Fourth Amendment requirements.
Accordingly, United States courts would have scant justification
for resisting the incorporation of standards derived from the
international Covenant into the determination of Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" abroad.
This conclusion is given additional weight by the
circumstances of the United States ratification of the
International Covenant. Ratification, at the close of the Cold War

286. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830, 831 n.34 (1988) (plurality
opinion) (looking to human rights treaties, including International Covenant, as
well as laws of other foreign states, In concluding that it would "offend civilized
standards of decency" to execute defendant who was less than 16 years old at
time of offense); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (considering "itihe climate of international opinion concerning the
acceptability of a particular punishment" and noting laws of other foreign states
in reaching conclusion that Eighth Amendment prohibited imposing death
penalty on defendant for felony murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596
n.10 (1977) (same, in holding that death sentence for crime of rape of adult
woman was excessive punishment forbidden by Eighth Amendment). But see
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.)
(disagreeing with dissenters' reference to international and foreign standards to

determine "evolving standards of decency"; emphasizing Instead "that It Is
American conceptions of decency that are dispositive"). See generally Joan F.
Hartman, "Unusual" Punlshment- The Domestic Effects of International Norms
Restricting the Applicationof the Death Penalty, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 655 (1983).
287. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388-89 (10th Cir.
1981) (looking to international law prohibition against arbitrary imprisonment in
construing Immigration and Naturalization Act, and concluding that "lit seems
proper to consider international law principles for notions of fairness as to
propriety of holding aliens in detention"); In re Naturalization of Weitzman, 426
F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curlam) (looking to Nuremberg principles and to
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to construe provision of naturalization
laws).
288. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709-10 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting in part) (referring to Nuremberg principles in concluding that drug
experiments on serviceman constituted "conduct . . . beyond the bounds of
human decency" and thus prohibited by Due Process Clause); see also Gordon A.
Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection
Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1983).
289. For a thorough canvassing of the topic, see Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick,
supra note 249, at 72-80.
290. See Id. at 26 nn. 136-39.
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and the birth of the self-proclaimed "New World Order,"2 9 1
constituted a declaration by the political branches of renewed
United States commitment to an international human rights
process, a commitment to joining the rest of the world in
constructing a basic minimum standard of international due
Incorporation of the Covenant's standards into
process. 29 2
Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" could thus credibly be seen
as a judicial ratification of congressional and executive intent. 293
2. Evaluating the International Benchmark
The international benchmark approach would offer
alternative to current United States practice, and a
addressing some of the concerns articulated in Part II
requiring the kind of ad hoc interpretation of foreign law

binatlonal approach would require.

globally

shared

content

to

the

a viable
way of
without
that the

By adding substantive,

nebulous

concept

of

.reasonableness" in transnational searches, the approach would
be responsive to concerns about United States unilateralism. By
fostering the creation of a unitary global standard for
transnational searches and seizures, this approach could have a
powerful prescriptive effect that a binational approach would lack.
The difficulties involved in such an approach, however, would be
significant, even beyond the difficulties associated with
These would include
construing a binding legal standard.
problems of administrability and of rights.
291. For insightful commentary on the impact of the end of the Cold War on
the status of international law, see W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLaw After
the Cold War, 84 AM. J. INTI L. 859 (1990).
292. See Letter from President George Bush to Hon. Clalborne Pell,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Aug. 8, 1991), reprinted in
SENATE REPORT, supra note 264, 31 I.L.M. at 660 (1992) ("The end of the Cold War
offers great opportunities for the forces of democracy and the rule of law
throughout the world ....
United States ratification.., at this moment in history
would underscore our natural commitment to fostering democratic values
. [and] would also strengthen our ability to
through international law . .
influence the development of appropriate human rights principles in the
international community... "); SENATE REPORT, supra note 264, at 3 ("ratification
will remove doubts about the seriousness of the United States commitment to
human rights and strengthen the Impact of United States efforts in the human
rights field").
293. As noted above, supra note 278, the proviso and reservations in the
instruments of ratification require that nothing in the Covenant be construed to
impose standards on the United States government more stringent than those
already required by domestic law. Incorporation of an international search-andseizure benchmark into Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" abroad would be
consistent with this intention, as it would essentially lower United States
extraterritorial search-and-seizure standards to the level of the rest of the world

rather than raising United States standards to some higher international
standard.
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First would be the practical difficulties that an international

benchmark standard would impose on police. The problem would
be similar to that which foreign police would face if United States
courts were to begin vigorously enforcing a unilateral Fourth
Amendment standard abroad. For instance, Mexican police,
trained in conducting searches according to Mexican law, would
be faced with a different set of rules if foreign police joined them
in a search.
Compounding the difficulty, they would not
necessarily know when they conducted a search whether to
conform their efforts to the standards of Mexican law or to the
international standard; they might begin a search for use in
Mexican courts only to have United States agents either join them
or simply request the fruits of the search for use in United States
courts.
A more fundamental problem inheres in the international
benchmark approach. At the heart of this approach is the notion
of a unitary standard, valid for the whole world, incorporating the
minimum protections of the world's major legal systems.

The

standard is thus, from the perspective of the participating states,
an abstract one, standing alone, divorced from the contexts of the
participants. The approach rests on the assumption that the
search-and-seizure standards of the world are fundamentally
similar; that the differences are merely in the particulars and not
in the core underlying conceptions of privacy-on the assumption,
that is, that each state has more in common than not regarding
its conception of the scope and nature of the individual realm and
of how this should be balanced against the prerogatives of the
state. 2 94 Problems in applying the standard would arise In
relation to the extent that each state's laws diverged from the
international benchmark.
What if, for instance, the benchmark in a given case were
more stringent than the laws of both participating states? This
might be the case, for example, in less-developed states with
poorly developed conceptions, and little history, of civil liberties.
The result would be that the police of both states would have to
meet a higher standard for a bi-state search than they would have
had to if either state had acted on its own. If this higher
international standard did not apply to searches wholly within the
boundaries of one state or the other, it is hard to see by what
theory a higher standard could apply simply because the search
involved both states. A far more probable scenario, on the other
hand, would be one in which the international benchmark was
more permissive than the laws of either participating state. 2 95 In
294. See discussion supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
295. This would certainly be the case, for example, for a cross-border United
States-Canadian prosecution.

19941

AN INTERNATIONAL FOURTHAMENDMENT

399

such a situation, the defendant, rather than the police, would
have reason to object. Why should he not have the protection of
either his own state's laws or the laws of the state that is
prosecuting him? Why should the fact that the police crossed a
border deprive him of the protections of both states? These
complaints, of course, are minor in relation to the valid
complaints that defendants of extraterritorial searches now have
in the wake of the Verdugo decision. Nevertheless, they point out
a key conceptual flaw in the international benchmark approach,
one from which the binational approach does not suffer.

V. FINE-TUNING THE INTERNATIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT

This final portion of the Article briefly addresses three issues
that must be resolved if either of the proposed approaches is to be
adopted. These issues are:
(1) What level of United States
participation should be required before the Fourth Amendment is
triggered by a joint search abroad?
(2) Should the courts
recognize a "good faith" exception that would excuse Fourth
Amendment violations if United States law enforcement agents
attempted in good faith to comply with local law? (3) Under what
circumstances, if at all, should the executive branch be able to
ignore constitutional or international law strictures when acting
abroad?
A. How Much United States ParticipationIs Enough?
Implementation of either the binational or the international
approach would give United .States courts an opportunity to
reassess their current, excessively severe interpretation of the
joint participation requirement. 298
Reassessment would be
particularly appropriate in light of the way in which both these
approaches address the concerns of United States courts
regarding an extraterritorial Fourth Amendment. Specifically, as
both approaches would make the Amendment less "impracticable
and anomalous," and far less of an imposition on local police and
local laws, courts should find correspondingly less reason to
require so high a level of United States participation before the
Amendment is triggered.

296. The courts, of course, will have this opportunity to some degree whether
or not this Article's proposals are adopted, since the Fourth Amendment
continues to protect United States citizens and resident aliens abroad after
Verdugo. See United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774, 781-83 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(applying Fourth Amendment requirements to searches of United States citizens
and resident aliens in foreign states and on high seas).
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1. The Failed Joint Venture Standard
To date, as noted above, courts have found United States
participation in foreign searches sufficient to trigger the Fourth
Amendment in only a handful of cases. 2 9 7 Among the activities
which have been held not to rise to the requisite level of
participation are: requesting, but not participating in, a foreign
search, 2 98 or otherwise "triggering the interest" of foreign
authorities who subsequently conduct a search and pass the
evidence on to United States authorities; 2 99 passing on tips which
prompt foreign police to initiate an investigation; 30 0 passing on
information requested by foreign governments; 30 ' joining foreign
police in a foreign-initiated search;3 02 participating in foreign
wiretaps, as long as United States agents do not "initiate,
supervise, control or direct" them;3 0 3 using information from an
illegal foreign wiretap to support a United States search
warrant;3 04 and even, in a few cases, triggering and then
participatingIn a foreign search.3 0 5
If these decisions embody a coherent standard on joint
participation, it is difficult to perceive. 3 06 While most courts have

297. See supra notes 198-202. The one court that has taken a liberal
approach to joint participation has been the Court of Military Appeals. See tnfra
notes 344-49 and accompanying text.
298. State v. Barajas, 238 N.W.2d 913 (Neb. 1976).
299. United States v. wolfish, 535 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied,
423 U.S. 1059 (1976).
300. United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139-40 (5th Cr. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
956 (1977); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 986 (1967).
301. United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 572 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
dented, 479 U.S. 827 (1986); United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp. 423, 431-32
(M.D. Fla. 1979).
302. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1230-31 (11th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Benedict, 647 F.2d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1981),
303. United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. dented,
426 U.S. 906 (1976).
304. United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1981).
305. United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 270-71 (7th Cir. 1976);
Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1968) (Browning, J.,
dissenting), cert. dented, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
306. Judge Browning pointed to the ambiguity inherent in the standard in his
dissent in Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 748, when he described the majority as holding
that "federal officers may participate in undertakings violative of Fourth
Amendment standards so long as they do not participate too much." The
standard appears to have acquired little clarity in the twenty-six years since that
time. As the Ninth Circuit noted in its Verdugo opinion, the courts "have not been
unanimous in their choice of the precise test to be applied-though they have as
a statistical matter been virtually unanimous in rejecting claims of undue
participation." 856 F.2d at 1225 (quoting United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120,
140 (5th Cr. 1976)). Commentators have been no more charitable in their

1994]

AN INTERNATIONAL FOURTHAMENDMENT

followed the test set out in Stonehill v. United States3 0 7-that

"Federal agents so substantially participated in the raids so as to
convert them into joint ventures"3 0a--or language essentially to
that effect;3 0 9 they have failed to articulate what this test entails
in any coherent fashion, instead applying the test in an ad hoc,
apparently result-oriented manner to the facts of the case at
hand.Slo Thus, in circumstances where the foreign search was
conducted at the request or suggestion of United States offcials,
courts have emphasized that direct United States participation in
searches was "insignificant;"3 1 ' in other cases in which United
States officials participated more substantially in the searches,
courts have focused on other factors, concluding, for instance,
that the raid was "instigated and planned" by foreign
authorities,3 12 or that its "purpose" was to gather evidence for a
foreign investigation (even though the evidence was later used in

evaluation. See Raffel, supra note 193, at 702-03; King, supra note 193, at 50405; Theisen, supra note 193, at 174-81; Harvard Note, supra note 15, at 1683-85.
307. Stonehll v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cerL denied,
395 U.S. 960 (1969).
308. Id. at 743;followed In Verdugo, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224-25 (1988); United
States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Rosenthal,
793 F.2d 1214, 1230-31 (11th Cir. 1986). At least one court has criticized the
Stonehill approach. See United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 907 (10th Cr.
1974) (in Fifth Amendment context, rejecting "Joint venture" as "a vague,
indefinite term and... in our view, unreliable").
309. Some courts, without specifically invoking "Joint ventures" or spelling
out what level of participation is required, have required that United States
officers "participate" in the search or that foreign officers "act as agents" for the
United States officers. See United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 573 (10th

Cir. 1985); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 25 (1st Cir), cert. dented, 461
U.S. 958 (1983; United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 140 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 430 U.S.
956 (1977). Another court has said that United States officers must have
"participated in some significant way." United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315,
1318 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
310. Accord King, supra note 193, at 504-05.
311. E.g., United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 270-71 (7th Cir. 1976)
(FBI agents traced suspects to Grand Cayman Island, notified local police, and
accompanied local police on arrest and seizure; held, no joint venture because
"there is no evidence that they took an active part in interrogating or searching
the suspects or in selecting evidence to seize"); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d
457, 463 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding United States participation insufficient in search
by Israeli police even though United States officials "triggered the interests" of the
Israelis and search appears to have been conducted entirely for use in United
States courts; insufficient because search "does not appear to have been
suggested, requested, or directed by any American official"), cert denied, 423 U.S.
1059 (1976).
312. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 746. Judge Browning's dissent, Id. at 749-50,
points out that United States agents' participation in the raids was not, as the
majority contended, insignificant.

402

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:329

a United States court).3 13 Whatever factors courts have focused
on, the result has been the same: courts have found insufficient
United States participation in all but the most indisputable
circumstances. If one had to judge by the few cases in which
joint participation has been found, one would have to conclude
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply abroad unless United
States officials both initiate the search and then continue to
participate actively as it unfolds.3 1 4
This near-elimination of Fourth Amendment liability cannot
have been intended by the Supreme Court when it formulated the
doctrine on which the joint venture standard was based. That
doctrine was the so-called "state-to-federal silver platter,"
developed by the Supreme Court in the period between 1914,
when Weeks v. United States3 1 5 established the exclusionary rule
for unlawful searches by federal officials, and 1960-1961, when
Elkins v. United States3 16 and Mapp v. Ohio3 1 7 extended the rule to
searches by state police. During this period, evidence unlawfully
seized by state police occupied essentially the same position as
evidence illegally seized by foreign police or private Individuals
313. United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 573-74 (10th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906-07 (10th Cir. 1974]; Stonehil, 405
F.2d at 746.
314. That, at least, has been the circumstance In those few cases in which
joint participation has been found. For a discussion of the Verdugo search, see
supra text accompanying note 23. The Verdugo majority noted that the DEAs
involvement in the search was so great that "no court could logically conclude
anything other than that the search was an American operation from start to

finish." 856 F.2d at 1225. In United States v. Peterson, 812 F,2d 486 (9th Cir.
1987), DEA agents initiated the investigation by alerting Philippine authorities
and then participated extensively in the wiretapping that ensued. Id. at 488-90.
In United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 25 (Ist Cr.), cert dented, 461 U.S. 958
(1983), the court found the question of a joint venture to be a "close" one where
United States agents initiated a high-seas chase and then provided armed backup
as the Canadians boarded. See also Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (holding that Fourth Amendment applied to Air Force discharge proceeding
in Japan, where Air Force investigators requested and obtained Japanese search
warrant and thdn joined Japanese officers in executing it at Air Force employee's
off-base dwelling); United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1131 (D.Colo.
1976) (finding Fourth Amendment triggered where United States agents were "full
partners" with Turkish police in placing wiretap on defendants telephone in
Istanbul). A somewhat more liberal approach to United States participation was
taken in one post-Verdugo case concerning an extraterritorial search of United
States citizens. In United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Cal. 1992), the
court concluded that the Fourth Amendment was triggered by the fact that a
beeper used to track the location of a narcotics smuggling vessel and installed in
the vessel by Australian authorities was installed at the request of United States
officials. Id. at 782.
315. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
316. 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (extending exclusionary rule to evidence unlawfully
seized by state officials and offered in federal court).
317. 364 U.S. 643 (1961) (same for evidence offered in state court).
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occupies today.3 18
In three decisions, the Supreme Court
addressed whether federal participation in a search had been
substantial enough to make the search federal, and its fruits
inadmissible, or whether instead the fruits of the search had been
handed over to federal officials "on a silver platter."3 19
The Supreme Court's two 1927 decisions, Byars v. United
States3 2 0 and Gambino v. United States,3 2 1 did not enunciate a
standard by which this question was to be addressed. In Byars, a
federal prohibition agent who had been invited to participate in a
state search, discovered counterfeit whiskey stamps, for which
the defendant was prosecuted in federal court.
The Court
concluded that the federal agent had been "asked to participate
and did participate as a federal enforcement officer, upon the
chance ... that something would be disclosed of official interest
to him."322 The agent's participation in the search, the Court
concluded, "was under color of his federal office and . . . the
search in substance and effect was a joint operation of the local
and federal officers"; accordingly, "the effect is the same as
though he had engaged in the undertaking as one exclusively his
own."32 3 Although the Court used the term "joint operation," it
did so to describe the facts of the case rather than to articulate a
standard by which federal involvement must be assessed. The
opinion is ambiguous on this point, but the dispositive fact for the
Court appeared to have been that the agent "participateld] as a
federal enforcement officer" in the search.3 24
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify these ambiguous
guidelines in 1949 in Lustlg v. United States.3 2 5 Lustig involved a
fact pattern strikingly similar to the typical foreign search, and
one which is notable, moreover, for the absence of a level of
participation that would constitute a joint venture today. The

318. "Private searches" are discussed supra part V.A.l.a.
319. Lustlg v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Gambino v. United States,

275 U.S. 310 (1927); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927). The "silver
platter" phrase is Justice Frankfurter's in Lustig, 338 U.S. at 79. The most
comprehensive discussion of these cases, and of the lower federal courts' struggle
to apply them, can be found in Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later
Illegal State Evidence in State andFederalCourts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (1959).
320. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
321. 275 U.S. 31Q (1927). In Gambino, the Court held that evidence
unlawfully obtained by state police must be excluded, even when no federal
official was present at the search, if the state police carried out the search "solely
for the purpose of aiding in [a] federal prosecution." Id. at 315.
322. 273 U.S. at 32.
323. Id. at 33.
324. Id. at 32; see also il. at 33 (evidence must be excluded "when the federal
government Itself, through its agents acting as such, participates in the wrongful
search and seizure").
325. 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
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case involved the search of a hotel room, initiated by local
police3 28 but joined in the middle by a Secret Service agent after
local police found evidence of counterfeiting activities. The federal

agent did not participate in the search itself but only (in the
manner of a DEA agent abroad) "exercised [his] expert's
discretion"3 2 7 in selecting and examining evidence. Local police
removed the evidence to the local police station, and only later
turned it over to federal authorities.3 2 8
In articulating the level of federal participation needed to
trigger the Fourth Amendment, Justice Frankfurter rejected the
trial court's conclusion that the lack of federal involvement in the
planning or execution of the search made it solely a state
operation.3 2 9 A search, Frankfurter stated, is a "functional, not
merely a physical, process," one that Is not severable into discrete
parts encompassing the planning, search, and analysis stages.
"The crux of [the Byars] doctrine," the Court declared, "is that a
search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it."330
The decisive factor is "the actuality of a share by a federal official

in the total enterprise."3 3 '

In determining the "actuality of a

share," it is "immaterial whether a federal agent originated the
idea or joined in it while the search was in progress. So long as
he was in it before the object of the search was completely
accomplished, he must be deemed to have participated in it."332
It was to these cases that the lower federal courts turned
when first faced with the problems of foreign searches.
In
Stonehill v. United States,33 3 the leading case on joint participation
and the case in which the joint venture standard was first
articulated, the Ninth Circuit turned to Byars and Lustig for its
guiding principles. 33 4 It concluded that the Fourth Amendment
applied to searches by foreign officials "only if Federal agents so
substantially participated in the raids so as to convert them into
joint ventures between the United States and the foreign
officials."3 3 5 This conclusion was, as Judge Browning pointed out

326. Although the federal agent alerted local police Initially to the potential
lawbreaking, the Court "accept[edi as a fact" that he "was not the moving force of
the search," and that the search was thus a locally-initlated search in
enforcement of local law. Id. at 78.
327. Id. at 79.
328. Id. at 77.

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id.
405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. dented, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
Id. at 743-44.
Id. at 743.
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in dissent, 33 6 a serious misreading of the Supreme Court
precedent. As Judge Browning noted, the reference to a "joint
operation" in Byars is sinply a description of the facts in that
case, not a formulation of a general standard: "If this was not
33 7
clear in Byars itself, the Supreme Court made it so in Lustg."
Stonehill's "Joint venture" test remains the standard employed
by the lower courts for foreign searches.3 3 8 But it clearly diverges

radically from the standard set out by the Court in Lustig. Rather
than require that a federal official both initiate the search and
then take an active role in carrying it out, as the lower courts
have required for foreign searches, 33 9 the Supreme Court in
Lustig required only that the officer "ha[ve] a hand in it," "a share
*. . in the total enterprise... before the object of the search was
completely accomplished." 40 This "share in the total enterprise,"
as the facts of Lustig made clear, does not have to be the kind of
active lead role that the foreign joint-participation cases have
required, but can consist of merely advising local police in the
selection and analysis of evidence. 3 41 Thus, the lower courts,
without announcing that they were doing so,342 have diverged
strongly in practice from the Supreme Court guidelines they have
claimed to follow.3 43
2. A Proposed Standard
This Article proposes that United States courts remain more
faithful to the Supreme Court's guidance in Lustig when
determining what level of United States participation will trigger
the Fourth Amendment. A kindred approach has been employed
by the United States Court of Military Appeals. In United States v.
3 4 4 the Court of Military Appeals, the nation's highest
Jordan,

336. Id. at 747-49 (Browning, J., dissenting). Judge Browning's conclusion
on this matter is supported by the commentators. See Kaplan, supra note 193, at
503-04; Raffel, supra note 193, at 697; Thelsen, supra note 193, at 176-78.
337. 405 F.2d at 748. The Supreme Court left no doubt: it stated that "[t]he
crux of the [Byars) doctrine" is that the exclusionary rule is triggered if a federal

officer "had a hand in it." 338 U.S. at 78.

338. See supra notes 308-09.
339. See supra note 314.

340. 338 U.S. at 78-79.
341. Id. Compare this with the foreign search cases cited supra notes 298-

305.
342. Research for this Article has turned up no case in which a court has
expressly announced that it was departing from Lustfg in order to construct a
narrower standard for foreign searches.
343. Accord 1 LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 1.8(g), at 216; Raffel, supra note 193,
at 695. LaFave finds the divergence Justified by the difference between domestic
and foreign searches. 1 LAFAVE, supra, at 217-18.
344. 1 M.J. 334 (C.MA. 1976) (on reconsideration).
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military tribunal,3 4 5 concluded that the Fourth Amendment would
be triggered in trials by court-martial "whenever American
officials are present at the scene of a foreign search, or even
though not present, provide any information or assistance,
directive or request, which sets in motion, aids, or otherwise
furthers the objectives of a foreign search."4 6 This standard,
subsequently narrowed so that mere presence, without

participation or instigation, does not trigger the Amendment,3 47

provides a helpful approach directed at preventing evasion of
Fourth Amendment requirements by United States officials.3 4"
The Jordan court reached its conclusion on the persuasive
ground that construing the vague joint venture standard had
constituted an "unending judicial dilemma" for the federal courts,
and had given United States law enforcement agents an
unfortunate incentive to "test the limits of the [joint participation]
doctrine" by delegating primary authority to foreign police to
gather evidence for use in United States courts.3 4 9 As the court
pointed out,3 5 0 similar considerations played a role in the
Supreme Court's decision in Elldns3S5L to abandon the state-tofederal silver platter. The Elkins Court concluded that eliminating
345. The Court of Military Appeals (C.M.A.) is the nation's military court of
last resort, comprising the third and highest tier of the military justice system.
Trials by court-martial in each of the armed services are conducted pursuant to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., the Manual for
Courts-Martial, and the Military Rules of Evidence, which follow the Federal Rules
of Evidence in most respects. Trial judgments are appealable to the Courts of
Military Review of the Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Navy-Marine Corps, and
from there to the C.M.A. The C.M.A.'s Judgments are appealable to the United
States Supreme Court. See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBuRG, ET AL., MILITARY
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUALx-Xii (2d ed. 1986); Kolb, supra note 193.
346. 1 M.J. at 338 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the court required in
such situations, much along the lines of the binational approach proposed by this
Article, that the government demonstrate that the foreign search was lawful under
local, not United States, law. Id. This aspect of Jordan has been superseded by
the Military Rules of Evidence, Implemented in 1980; the definition of "unlawful"
searches and seizures in Rule 311(c) is restricted to searches In violation of
United States laws and searches by foreign officials which "subjected the accused
to gross and brutal maltreatment." MIL. R. EVID. 311(c); see also Id., drafters'
analysis, reprintedin SALTZBURG, ETAL., supra note 345, at 199-200.
347. United States v. Morrison, 12 M.J. 272, 276-79 (C.M.A. 1982) (relying in
part on 1980 implementation of Military Rules of Evidence); followed n United
States v. Porter, 36 M.J. 812, 815-16 (A.C.M.R. 1993); United States v. Coleman,
25 M.J. 679, 685 (A.C.M.R. 1987).
348. See Morrison, 12 M.J. at 278 (basic purpose of Jordan was to prevent
evasion of constitutional requirements through recruitment of foreign police to
conduct searches); Coleman, 25 M.J. at 685 (Jordan and Morrison require that
foreign action not be conducted, instigated, or participated in by United States
officials, or used as subterfuge to circumvent constitutional protections).
349. 1 M.J. at 337.

350. Id. at 338.
351. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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the silver platter would eliminate the "inducement to subterfuge
and evasion" that the silver platter offered-the inducement to
"encourage state officers in the disregard of constitutionally
3 52
protected freedom."
Elkins, of course, concerned domestic searches, and United
States courts have displayed a markedly different attitude toward
searches abroad. The international silver platter is rooted in the
courts' firm conviction that foreign police remain entirely beyond
their ability to deter.3 5 3 This conviction, however, is belied by the

realities of transnational law enforcement. 354 While exclusion of
evidence by a United States court may not directly affect the
behavior of foreign police, it certainly affects the behavior of
United States law enforcement agents; and United States agents
in turn possess considerable ability, to influence the behavior of
foreign police. Stripped of their power to act effectively on their
own, United States police acquire the power to take effective
action overseas only to the extent that they learn to work with,
3 5 5 This
and influence the behavior of, their foreign counterparts.
they are able to do through a variety of methods, variously
involving appeals to professional pride, cultivation of longterm
working relationships, and the powerful carrot-and-stick
diplomatic leverage that the United States is capable of wielding
abroad.3 5 6 Thus, the application by United States courts of the
exclusionary remedy to foreign searches in which United States
police had a hand, will cause those police to exercise care that the
searches are carried out legally, not only by themselves but by
their foreign colleagues as well.
Determining the level of United States participation at which
the Fourth Amendment should be triggered is, of course, a tricky
business, but the approaches laid out in Lustig and Jordan,
requiring a "share in the total enterprise," provide a useful
starting point. A "share in the enterprise" standard would
352. Id. at 221-22. The Court also relied on other reasons which do not apply

to foreign searches-in particular, that Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), had

made the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states, thus undermining the
foundation on which the admissibility of state-seized evidence rested. E/lns, 364
U.S. at 213.
353. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
354. See supra part III.B. I do not, of course, mean to suggest that foreign

and domestic searches should be Ireated as if they were entirely the same, only
that some common ground exists. Foreign searches, obviously, differ in crucial
ways from the joint state-and-federal searches with which Elkns was concerned,
as part III.B describes. Most notably, there is no common Constitution and no
Part V.B tnfra provides a response to these
Supremacy Clause abroad.
differences.
355. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
356. See NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 3, at 190-91, 288-91,
297-307.
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require, following Jordan, that the Fourth Amendment be
triggered by provision of "any information or assistance, directive
or request, which sets in motion, aids, or otherwise furthers the
objectives of a foreign search."3 5 7 The mere presence of a United
States official would not by itself trigger the Amendment.35 8 But
any action that led to a search3 5 9 and any participation in the

search beyond mere presence60 would be sufficient-in short,
any sign that the foreign search was used by United States
officials to evade constitutional requirements. The fact that
evidence seized in a foreign search is offered in a United States
court should create a presumption that United States agents "had
a hand in it" or influenced the search in some way with an eye for
later use of the evidence. The government should be able to rebut
this presumption by demonstrating that it took no action to
trigger the search or otherwise influence its outcome, other than
action taken solely to protect the rights of those present.
This approach would set the level of United States
participation at a more appropriate level than the joint venture
standard. The current standard allows United States officials to
instigatessl or influence3 6 2 a search without being bound by the
Fourth Amendment, thus accomplishing by indirection what they
could not accomplish directly. In contrast, a "share in the
enterprise" standard would identify more accurately those
circumstances in which United States sovereign power was being
exercised-those circumstances in which (in Justice Brennan's

357. Jordan, 1 M.J. at 338.
358. Even though a "mere presence" rule would greatly simplify the process of
determining United States participation, it should be rejected, following the lead
of MIL. R. EVID. 31 1(c)(3) (specifying that a search "is not particlpated in' merely
because a [United States official] is present") and the Court of Military Appeals in
United States v. Morrison, 12 M.J. 272, 276-78 (C.M.A. 1982). As both the
Monison court and Professor Saltzburg have noted, the presence of United States

officials at a foreign search can have a significant restraining effect on foreign
police. Id. at 278; Saltzburg, supra note 77, at 766. Implementing a merepresence rule would have the effect of inducing United States law enforcement
officials to stay away from foreign searches so as to avoid suppression of the
fruits, and thus could "deny U.S. citizens abroad a friend at a time when they
most need one." Saltzburg, supra, at 766.
359. As In the cases cited supra notes 298-300.
360. As in the cases cited supra notes 302-03, 305. I would accept the
general conclusion of Justice Reed, dissenting in Lustfg, 338 U.S. at 83, that
merely analyzing evidence after a search has been completed should not
constitute participation. However, when this analysis has taken place at the

search site, as in Lustig, it raises a strong presumption that the officer was on
hand to influence the direction of the search.
361. See supra notes 298-300.
362. See supra notes 302-03, 305.
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One serious concern, however, must be raised. While the
Lustig approach would be far less susceptible to evasion than the
joint venture standard, it would raise the possibility that United
States law enforcement agents could be penalized for violations by
foreign police in which they themselves had not participated,
either expressly or tacitly. This concern would arise most acutely
in searches which United States officials had triggered in some
way but in which they subsequently had not participated.3 6 4
While this Article has argued that such searches should not fall
beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment, nevertheless a
mechanism would be needed to protect United States law
enforcement agents from being penalized in such circumstances
where their participation was entirely unrelated to the violation
'and where they were not in a position to stop the violation. Such
a mechanism could be provided by adoption of a limited "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, as discussed below.
B. Good FaithCompliance
A good faith exception for foreign searches would be
addressed to circumstances in which United States officials relied

in good faith, but erroneously, on the representations of foreign
officials that a particular search complied with local law. The
exception would represent an extension of a similar rule in the
warrant context, the good faith doctrine enunciated in United
States v. Leon.3 8 5 In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the fruit
of a search should not be suppressed when officers conducted the
search in reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant
and only later discovered that the warrant was invalid. Leon's
reasoning subsequently was adopted for the foreign-search
3 66
context by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Peterson.

363. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
364. E.g., the cases cited supra notes 298-300.
365. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). For a general discussion of Leon and its effect,
see 1 LAFAVE, supranote 53, § 1.3.
366. 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of the case, see supra
note 205. Peterson's good faith exception has been followed by the few courts
that have addressed the issue. United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774, 782-83
(N.D. Cal. 1992); Lau v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D.P.R. 1991); United
States v. Staino, 690 F. Supp. 406, 410-11 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affid, 888 F.2d 1383
(3d Cir. 1989). The approach has also received some academic support. See
Wedgwood, supra note 53, at 754 (not citing Peterson, but advocating "totality of
the circumstances" approach to Fourth Amendment abroad, taking into
consideration "good faith attempt to comply with the search procedures of foreign
law").
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Leon's rationale was that "the exclusionary rule is designed to
deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges
and magistrates" 3 67-that magistrates, who are not "adjuncts to
the law enforcement team," but rather neutral judicial officers
with no stake in the outcome of the cases they oversee, will not be
benefited in their decisionmaking process by the threat of
exclusion.3 68

In Peterson, then-Judge Kennedy stretched Leon's

scope to address the difficulties faced by United States law
enforcement officers in the foreign search context.
The
exclusionary rule, he reasoned, "does not function as a deterrent
in cases in which the law enforcement officers acted on a
reasonable belief that their conduct was legal."3 6 9 American law
enforcement officers in the Philippines "were not in an
advantageous position to judge whether the search was lawful, as
would have been the case in a domestic setting." 7 0
Consequently, "[h]olding them to a strict liability standard for
failings of their foreign associates would be even more
incongruous than holding law enforcement officials to a strict
liability standard as to the adequacy of domestic warrants."3 7 1
Instead, Kennedy concluded, American officials should be allowed
to "reasonabl[y] re[y]" on representations by foreign police that a
particular search complied with local law.3 7 2
DEA agents'
reliance in Peterson was "objectively reasonable," Judge Kennedy
concluded, because they sought and received assurances (later
found to be erroneous) from high-ranking law enforcement

authorities in the Philippines that the wiretap on which the
search was based had been obtained in compliance with
Philippine law. 3 7 3
Peterson represents a specific application of the broader
suggestion, which has been made by Justice White among others,
that Leon's good faith exception be extended generally to the
nonwarrant context. Thus, Justice White has suggested that
where law enforcement officers conducting warrantless searches
were "acting in objective good faith," even though unlawfully, then
the fruits of their search should not be suppressed.3 74 While
367. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
368. Id. at 917. For a thoughtful evaluation of Leon's probable effect on the
warrant-issuing process, offering a mixed prognosis, see Abraham S. Goldstein,
The Search Warrant The Magistrate, and Judictal Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173
(1987).
369. 812 F.2d at 492.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1056 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting); cf. Leon, 468 U.S. at 959 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I am not at all
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such attempts to extend Leon beyond the warrant context have
been justifiably attacked by commentators,3 7 5 the critiques carry
less force in the foreign search context, where the need for a good
faith exception is greater.
As the commentators have pointed out, the rule of Leon is

grounded in a key distinction, between deterrence of police

misconduct and of judicial error. Exclusion is a remedy aimed at
the police; as the Leon Court noted, magistrates operate by a
different set of incentives.3 7 8 The threat of exclusion carries no
weight for a magistrate. Instead, a magistrate's incentive to take
care in signing warrants is provided by the possibility that a
reviewing court will find error in his or her determination of
probable cause--a threat which remains good whether or not the
377
exclusionary remedy is applied.
Additionally, Leon's good faith rule provides one clear
incidental benefit-a strong incentive for police to obtain and rely
Warrants, of course, carry the
on judicial warrants.3 7
substantial benefit of interposing a neutral and detached
decisionmaker between the police and their law enforcement
goals. Extending Leon beyond the warrant context would
eliminate this benefit and instead induce police to test the limits
of courts' tolerance for dubious conduct; courts then would be
forced to defer to the result-driven judgments of police instead of
3 79
to the presumably neutral judgments of a magistrate.

confident that the exception unleashed today will remain so confined. Indeed, the
full impact of the Court's regrettable decisions will not be felt until the Court
attempts to extend this rule to situations in which the police have conducted a
warrantless search solely on the basis of their own judgment about the existence
of probable cause and exigent circumstances. When that question is finally
posed, I for one will not be surprised if my colleagues decide once again that we

simply cannot afford to protect Fourth Amendment rights.").

375. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 1.3(g); Craig M. Bradley, The "Good Faith

Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287, 298-99

(1985); Donald DrIpps, Living with Leon, 95 Yale. L.J. 906, 944-47 (1986); William
Unprecedented,
W. Greenhalgh, The Warrantless Good Faith Exception:
Indefensible, and Devoid of Necessity, 26 So. TEx. L.J. 129 (1985); Robert L.
Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

507, 508 (1986); David R. Childress, Note, Maryland v. Garrison: Extending the
Good FaithException to Warrantless Searches,40 BAYLOR L. REv. 151 (1988).
376. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984).
377. Id.; accord 1 LAFAVE, supra note 206, § 1.3(g), at 78.
378. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 1.3(g), at 78; Bradley, supra note 375, at 299;
Dripps, supra note 375, at 946-47.
379. Police officers would be likely to set standards for their future conduct,
not by the traditional Fourth Amendment standards of probable cause, exigent
circumstances, and so on, but rather by whatever level of conduct happened to
pass the good faith test in court. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 1.3(g), at 79; Dripps,
supra note 375, at 946. Judicial determination of whether probable cause or
exigent circumstances existed would be replaced, additionally, by the vastly more
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These general critiques, however, are only partially applicable
to the foreign-search context. The problem of judicial deference to
police judgments, of course, would remain, but the approach
would rest on far stronger justification.
Courts would be
deferring not to the judgments of United States police about the
legality of their own searches under United States law, but to
assurances by foreign police that a search was being conducted in
compliance with foreign law. While this would not be a result to
be encouraged, its costs would have to be balanced against the
costs of not having a good faith exception abroad. Failure to
implement the exception for foreign searches would mean that
United States law enforcement agents could be penalized by
exclusion in situations in which they had not in any way
participated in the violation and were in no position to stop it.380
In order, then, to protect the good faith efforts of United
States law enforcement agents, while at the same time not
undermining entirely the effect of a relaxed joint participation
standard, a careful balance would need to be struck. If care were
not taken, a good faith rule could prove as easily manipulated by
law enforcement and the courts as the joint venture standard and
as Peterson's essentially standardless proposal.
Unless the
exception were governed by a workable procedure, a good faith
exception would encourage, at best, a careless attitude toward
detail, and at worst, willful ignorance or collusion between United
States and foreign police.
To strike this balance, United States law enforcement agents
should carry the burden of demonstrating that they made a good
faith effort to ensure that the search was lawful. United States
officials could be required, for instance, in any search in which
they intended to keep open the possibility of good faith reliance,
to make an official request for assistance from their foreign

counterparts. 3 8 '

This request, made

in writing whenever

possible,3 8 2 could state specifically what action was requested:
what place was to be searched, upon what factual basis, In what
manner, and what specific items were to be seized. Such a

slippery determination of whether police "reasonably thought" probable cause or
exigent circumstances existed. 1 LAFAVE, supra, at 78.
380. This would be most likely to occur in situations in which United States
police requested a search but did not participate in carrying it out. See, e.g., the
cases cited supranotes 298-300.
381. This idea is adapted from a similar proposal in Saltzburg, supra note 77,
at 771 & n.150.
382. A variation on the "telephone warrant" technique could be employed If
conveying a written request were burdensome under the circumstances. See
supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. That is, United States officials could
read a written request over the telephone and also record and transcribe the
telephone conversation for later admission in court.
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request, of course, like an extraterritorial warrant,3 8 3 would not
obligate foreign officials to comply. Nonetheless, like a warrant, it
would serve as a tool by which to judge the legitimacy of United
If foreign police diverged from United States
States action.
officials' instructions and conducted an unlawful search as a
result, the evidence could nevertheless be admitted under the
good faith exception so long as action pursuant to the request

would have been lawful.384

C. The Limits of Executive Power
The final issue to be resolved in implementing an
international Fourth Amendment concerns the degree to which
the executive branch may be bound by constitutional restrictions
when acting pursuant to its broad power to conduct foreign
affairs: To what degree is the foreign affairs power committed to
the President exclusively, at the expense of Congress and the
courts? Chief Justice Rehnquist drew heavily on concerns of this
nature in concluding, in his Opinion of the Court in Verdugo, that
the United States could not afford to extend the Fourth
He
Amendment's protections to noncitizens overseas.3 8 5
concluded that restrictions on searches and seizures abroad must
be imposed, if at all, by the political branches, given the
"significant and deleterious consequences" to presidential freedom
abroad that could result from judicial interference in foreign
affairs. 3 86
The Chief Justice's conclusion was the product of two related
"membership"
Hobbesian
traditions-the
jurisprudential
approach to civil liberties, discussed above,' 8 7 and the foreign
affairs tradition embodied in United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport
Corp.3 8 8 that views the President as the "sole organ of the nation"
in the broad external realm.3 8 9 Just as the Chief Justice's

383. See supra part ll.B.2.b.i.
384. Probably defendants should be allowed to rebut United States agents'

showing of good faith by evidence that they colluded with foreign police to
conduct a search beyond the scope of the request.
385. See supranotes 40-45 and accompanying text.
386. 494 U.S. at 273-75. Such consequences, he concluded, could include

even the prospect of aliens suing the United States in wartime for violations of
their civil rights. Id. at 274.
387. See spra part II.B.1.
388. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
389. Id. at 319; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
Chief Justice Rehnqulst's opinion in United States v. Alvarez324 (1937).
Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992), may be seen as the latest expression of this
tradition, although the Court did not cite Curtiss-WrIght directly. For a critical
overview of the Curttss-Wright tradition, see HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL
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membership approach finds its opposing counterpart in the
municipal law approach embraced by Justice Brennan, 3 90 so the
Curtlss-Wright tradition finds its counterpart in the competing
tradition embodied in

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.

Sawyer3 9 1 which views Congress, the President, and the courts as
joint participants in the foreign affairs field.392 This Article,

however, has attempted to sidestep the need for resolution of
these larger structural constitutional questions to some degree,
by demonstrating the underlying legitimacy of Justice Brennan's
"mutuality" approach while at the same time addressing the Chief
Justice's legitimate practical concerns about its application. The
"international Fourth Amendment" would strike a balance
between Chief Justice Rehnquist's water's edge rule and Justice
Brennan's wholesale transplantation of the Fourth Amendment
abroad, while at the same time addressing the transnatlonal
context of searches abroad.
One pragmatic concern, however, remains to be
addressed-the concern, expressed by the Chief Justice, that an
extraterritorial Fourth Amendment would hamper national
security operations conducted by the military overseas. 3 9 3 This
need not be a problem as far as pure military operations without
law enforcement objectives are concerned; as Justice Brennan
pointed out, the Fourth Amendment simply would not reach such
operations. 39 4 The "mutuality" principle extends constitutional
protections only to those whom the government treats as "the
governed," for example by investigating and prosecuting them;3 95
since enemy aliens in wartime have no claim to such a status,398
Chief Justice Rehnquist's doomsday scenario of a multitude of
SECURITY CONsTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 93-100,
134-46 (1990).
390. See supra part ll.B.2.

391. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
392. The classic expression of this tradition is Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion in Youngstown. Id. at 634, 635-38. Youngstown has been echoed in such
cases as Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (requiring clear statutory statement

of congressional authorization before condoning executive infringement on
individual's constitutional right to travel), and United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 263 (1967) (refusing to accept executive Invocation of congressional war
power as "talismanic incantation" to support violation of constitutional rights). An

extended argument in favor of this tradition is made in

KOH,

supra note 389, at

105-13 & passim.
393. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-74 (1990).
394. Id. at 291-92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
395. Id. Justice Blackmun attempted to clarify Justice Brennan's somewhat
slippery distinction by distinguishing between the government's "exercise of power
abroad," which "does not ordinarily implicate the Fourth Amendment," and "the

enforcement of domestic criminal law, which seems to me to be the paradigmatic
exercise of sovereignty over those who are compelled to obey." Id. at 297
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
396. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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hostile aliens bringing suit in United States courts to enforce the
Additionally, as Justice
Fourth Amendment is unfounded.
Brennan noted, courts could limit invocation of the Fourth
Amendment by nonresident aliens to defensive use, via the
exclusionary rule, and preclude offensive use of the Amendment
397
through so-called Blvens suits for damages.
The Chief Justice's concern has more force when it is applied
to "mixed" operations encompassing both law enforcement and
Such operations became more
national security objectives.
common through the 1980s as the United States, responding to
the global threats of narcotics trafficking and terrorism, relied
increasingly on the military as a kind of extraterritorial police
force. 3 9 8 Examples include the Noriega operation,3 99 the massive
anti-narcotics operations conducted by the military in Latin
40 0
America, and the recent humanitarian operation in Somalia.
Drawing lines between "law enforcement" and "national security"
in such situations would indeed be one of the most difficult

challenges that the courts would face in construing an
international Fourth Amendment.
Courts, however, would not be entirely without resources to
deal with such circumstances. They could look in such situations
397. 494 U.S. at 292-93 (following Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics

Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (precluding actions for damages for Fourth
Amendment violations where there are "special factors counselling hesitation"));
accord Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(concluding that "the special needs of foreign affairs" preclude creation of damage
remedies against United States officials for constitutional injuries of noncitizens
abroad). As at least one commentator has noted, defensive use of the Fourth
Amendment by noncitizens does not pose the same threat of embarrassment to
the political branches that offensive use would. Harvard Note, supra note 15, at
1680-81. The only individuals in a position to use the defensive remedy would be
those whom the United States chooses to prosecute; such prosecution would
substantially strengthen the nexus between those individuals and the United
States government, entiting them to constitutional defenses.
398. Or "911 for the world," in Rep. Patricia Schroeder's phrase.
Confrontaton in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at A1O. For general
discussions of the military's increasing involvement in law enforcement overseas,
and of the legal issues this raises, see Donesa, supranote 9; Coffey, supranote 9.
399. See supra notes 154-57. The Noriega trial was pending at the time that
the Supreme Court decided Verdugo, and, although it was not mentioned by the
Court, the possibility that General Noriega might be able to invoke the Fourth
Amendment must have been on the Justices' minds as they considered Verdugo.
The NorLega court subsequently referred to Verdugo in rejecting General Noriega's
Fifth Amendment due process claims. See United States v. Norlega, 746 F. Supp.
1506, 1532 n.28 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
400. For one court's effort to untangle the elements in such a "mixed"
situation abroad, see Ramlrez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cr.
1984) (en banc) (application of Fifth Amendment to "taking" of Honduran cattle
ranch by United States Army for use as camp to, train Salvadoran soldiers),
vacated and remanded as moot, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985). See also Wedgwood, supra
note 53, at 751-53.
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to traditional "doctrines of restraint" such as the political question
and separation-of-powers doctrines. 40 '
(A third doctrine,
concerning the relation between customary international law and
.controlling executive acts," Is discussed in the margin.). 40 2 An
operation that crossed the line separating law enforcement from
acts of war, such as the operation against General Noriega, would
trigger serious justiciability concerns. 40 3 Additionally, as Justice
401. For an incisive examination of how such doctrinal bars may be used to
winnow the appropriate from the inappropriate transnational cases on courts'
dockets, see Koh, TransnatonalPublic Law Litigation, supra note 249, at 2382-94
(urging selective targeting of separation-of-powers, judicial competence, and
comity concerns). See also Ramlrez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1511-15 (examining
justiciability of extraterritorial "taking" by United States military); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinions of Edwards, Bork,
& Robb, JJ.) (employing three different rationales to dismiss suit brought under
Alien Tort Statute by Israeli citizens who had been subjected to PLO torture and
terrorism in Israel), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
402. Under this doctrine, which would arise only in response to the
international benchmark approach, the President may, through a "controlling

act," effectively supersede otherwise-controlling customary international law.
Thus, he could announce that a particular operation (the mission to seize General
Norlega, for instance) was intended to be a "controlling act" by which he overrode
the minimal search-and-seLzure standards imposed by the international
benchmark. See generally Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower, supra note
249, at 116-20; May the PresidentViolate Customary InternationalLaw? (cont'd), 81
AM. J. INTLL. 371 (1987) (comments by Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr., Anthony D'Amato,
and Jordan J. Paust); OLC Opinion, supra note 159.
The "controlling act" doctrine derives from dictum in Justice Gray's turn-ofthe-century classic opinion The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). After
stating that international law "is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction," Justice Gray
added that "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations." Id. at 700. Scholars differ sharply over the scope and meaning to be
given to this cryptic statement. The general weight of scholarly opinion stands
behind the proposition that the President may override customary international
law only when acting jointly with Congress, see Lobel, supra, at 1114-21, or when
functioning in his role as chief diplomat or commander In chief of the armed
forces, see Kirgis, supra, at 373-75. Some courts and the Department of Justice,
on the other hand, have interpreted the President's power more broadly. See
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding Justice
Department decision to incarcerate Mariel Cuban refugees indefinitely without
hearings, in violation of international law, on ground that DOJ decision
constituted "controlling executive act," despite lack of express authorization by
the President); OLC Opinion, supra note 159. If construed somewhat more
narrowly than the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation, the doctrine could serve as a
useful limitation on the binding nature of an international benchmark standard.
That is, like the political question or separation-of-powers doctrines, Ifjudiciously
applied, it could provide a necessary safety valve freeing the President from
international law constraints in moments of political import, although not in the
ordinary course of business.
403. See United States v. Norlega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1537-40 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (concluding that claim of government misconduct in invading Panama and
capturing Noriega was nonjusticiable challenge to conduct of foreign policy,
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Brennan suggested in Verdugo, a Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard would necessarily take into account "all

of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the
nature of the search or seizure itself."404 In other words, while
some kinds of extraterritorial operations may indeed give courts
pause in applying an extraterritorial Fourth Amendment, and a
few cases may present close questions, there is no reason to
believe courts would lack the tools to draw the appropriate
distinctions
between
garden-variety
extraterritorial
law
enforcement, such as the operation against Verdugo, to which the
Fourth Amendment would apply, and operations implicating
broader and more inherently political questions of national policy,
to which it would not.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's inconclusive tangle with extraterritorial
searches and seizures in Verdugo represents the beginning, not
the end, of the task that the Court faces in articulating a
workable response to the complex realities of modem
transnational law enforcement. This Article has tried to steer a
middle path between the concerns of those who, like the Chief
Justice, would confine the Fourth Amendment to the "water's
edge" and those who, like Justice Brennan, would blanket the
world with the Bill of Rights. It has tried to examine those
concerns from a perspective more attuned to the transnational
context within which extraterritorial searches take place. The
binational and international approaches that are proposed, it is
hoped, will constitute useful suggestions for the start of the
daunting process of laying out judicial guidelines in this most
difficult of areas, at the intersection of a host of diverse concerns,
values, laws, and participants. United States courts cannot
continue, as in Verdugo, to view extraterritorial searches and
seizures from preconceived domestic perspectives, but must begin
the hard task of mapping out a judicial role for searches and
seizures abroad-a role that may be necessarily more limited in
scope than the role of the courts in monitoring domestic searches,
but not a role that, as Chief Justice Rehnquist would have it, can
be abandoned entirely.
barred by political question doctrine and separation of powers); cf. Ramirez de
Arelano, 745 F.2d at 1512 (" lssues which are not at base sweeping challenges to
the Executive's foreign policy typically are adjudicated by the courts because they

do not involve judicial usurpation of the Executive's constitutional powers to
manage foreign affairs").
404. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 292 (quoting United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).

